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This thesis compares the Western response to two radical challenges in eras 
considerably removed in time: the 1900-1901 Boxer rebellion in China and today’s 
Islamic terror. It brings a much-needed historical perspective to bear in assessing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary Western conceptualization of the al-Qaeda 
and Taliban threat as a “clash of civilizations.”  
Two years after the al-Qaeda terror attack on the twin towers of the World Trade 
Center in New York and the global fight against terrorism run by the USA and its allies 
has started, there is still no agreement on how these incidents are to be classified and 
assessed historically. In the USA, September 11 immediately aroused memories of the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. An association with the Boxer Uprising was not 
made, although it would have been possible with great justification. Whereas the 
Japanese attack had been an expression of classical state power politics, the Boxer 
Uprising and the attack on the World Trade Center were non-sovereign terror attacks, 
symbolizing the fight against the dominance of Western culture and Western influence, 
sensed as being overpowering. A comparison with the Boxer revolt contributes to a 
common understanding that Islam and Confucianism are particularly at odds with 
Western civilization and its democratic, secular, and liberal social and political ethos 
because of their fundamentally different belief and value system. As it has been the case 
for the Boxer rebellion, the inevitability of a clash with militant Islamists derives from 
the universalistic vocation of Western civilization as well as from its global appeal and 
hence its existential challenge to other civilizations. 
 The thesis demonstrates that the current struggle against Islamic fundamentalism 
is not an altogether new challenge to Western interest and values. Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban are in the end an expression of the same forces of resistance that also led to the 
origination of the Boxers in 19th century China. The cultural pressure that the West 
unavoidably developed by its imperialistic policy in the 19th and early 20th centuries was 
replaced by the penetration of the world with values, standards and symbols of the 
Western way of life and civilization in the course of globalization. The West ought to 
understand that the current terrorist threat is not “the next stage of history,” as some 
 vi
scholars erroneously puts it, but a known historical phenomenon in a new form, for which 
neither the West nor other cultures bear the blame. 
Although there can be no doubt about the fact that both phenomena are the results 
of unique and complex historical processes, a precise comparison of these differing 
incidents, separated by less than 100 years, opens our eyes for the specifically new and 
unique elements of the current challenge to the West. A historical comparison of the 
West's reaction to the Boxer Rebellion with the efforts by the USA and its allies to 
counteract the al-Qaeda terror network and the Taliban, who provided it with protection 
and a safe haven, therefore also permits further statements about the chances of success 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 Two years after the al-Qaeda terror attack on the twin towers of the World Trade 
Center in New York and the global fight against terrorism run by the USA and its allies 
began, there is still no agreement on how these incidents are to be classified and assessed 
historically.1 Are they the harbingers of the “clash of civilizations” forecast by Samuel P. 
Huntington? A form of resistance against globalization based on Western values and 
laws? The result of profane economic interests in power, a question of the control over 
the global strategic stocks of oil and enormous profits? Or are they a new chapter in the 
long-lasting historical conflict between the Islamic world and the Occident? Europeans 
and Americans have realized that there is a unifying streak of anti-Americanism and anti-
Westernism pervading Muslim societies all over the world and that fighting it will entail 
a global enterprise. But as with the 1900-1901 Boxer crisis, the West again has 
difficulties to agree on a common counter strategy for it does not entirely understand the 
roots of this Kulturkampf between the West and Islam. 
In the USA, September 11 immediately aroused memories of the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor in 19412 An association with the Boxer Uprising was not made, although it would 
have been possible with great justification to an historically informed observer. Whereas 
the Japanese attack had been an expression of classical state power politics, the Boxer 
Uprising and the attack on the World Trade Center were non-sovereign terror attacks, 
symbolizing the fight against the dominance of Western culture and Western influence, 
which was perceived to overpowering. A comparison with the Boxer revolt may have 
contributed to a common understanding that Islam and Confucianism are particularly at 
odds with Western civilization and its democratic, secular, and liberal social and political 
ethos “because of their fundamentally different belief and value system.” As it has been 
the case for the Boxer rebellion, the inevitability of a clash with militant Islamists 
“derives from the universalistic vocation of Western civilization as well as from its global 
                                                 
1  See Michael Radu, Terrorism after the Cold War: Trends and Challenges, Orbis (2002), pp. 275-287, 
p. 275-276. 
2  See Lee Harris, Civilization and Its Enemies. The Next Stage of History, New York 2004, p. 3; Bruce 
Lincoln, Holy Terrors. Thinking about Religion after September 11, Chicago  2003, p. 17; Paul 
Rogers, A War on Terror. Afghanistan and After, London 2004, p. 15-16. 
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appeal and hence its existential challenge to other civilizations.”3 Nevertheless, the often-
made comparison of the terror attacks of 9/11 with the Japanese attack in 1941 proves the 
need and usefulness of an historical perspective for any analysis of the West's current 
confrontation with Islamic extremism. 
In the combat against terror, in particular in the campaign against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, analogies to imperial China in 1900 become apparent. In both cases, the 
enemy frequently remained out of focus and, it soon became clear, could not be beaten by 
military means alone. Whereas the European colonial powers, including the United States 
of America and Japan, saw themselves confronted with an equally ant-Western, 
xenophobic and religiously motivated challenge to their imperialistic claim to power at 
the start of the 20th century, the current terror in the name of Islam is interpreted as a fight 
against the cultural and ideological leadership of the West and as a “clash of 
civilizations.”4 Boxers and Islamists have in common a furious rejection of Western 
culture and values and the wish to preserve their own, century-old civilization which is 
dangerously threatened by the global spread of Western power, economics, way of life 
and culture. As Hedley Bull already demonstrated in 1984, this negative reaction to 
Western cultural domination goes along with a revolt against everything the West stands 
for:  
 
But the re-assertion by […] non Western peoples of their traditional and 
indigenous cultures, as exemplified in Islamic fundamentalism […] has 
raised the question whether what has been widely interpreted as a revolt 
against Western dominance carried out in the name of Western values, is 
not a revolt against Western values as such.5 
 
As in the past, from a superficial point of view, the West today sees itself 
confronted with similar risks and challenges similar to those in dealing with the Boxers 
and reacts with comparable strategies. Against this background, it appears helpful to use 
the historical example of the Boxer Rebellion as a reference in the analysis and 
                                                 
3  Shireen T. Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West. Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence, 
Westport 1998, p. 6. 
4  See Glenn E. Perry, Huntington and His Critics: The West and Islam, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24 
(2002), no.1, pp. 31-48. 
5  Hedley Bull, The Revolt Against the West, in Hedley Bull/Adam Watson (ed.), The Expansion of 
International Society, Oxford 1984, pp. 217-228, p. 223. 
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assessment of the current phenomenon of Islamic terror and, in particular, in the search 
for suitable and promising possibilities of reacting to this threat.  
In the condemnation of part or the entire West by the Boxers and Islamists, the 
West has been and still is often described as innocent. While the Boxer movement is 
described as an effort to preserve an ancient Confucian society and to stop Western 
modernization that threatened its very existence, it has been – and still is – argued that the 
Islamists’ revulsion toward the West stems from Muslim feelings of humiliation 
occasioned by the fact that Islamic countries have found themselves subordinate to the 
West since the late 18th century.6 In this explanation, mainly given vent to by Bernard 
Lewis, it is argued that there are vestiges of an originally Manichaean belief in “cosmic 
power struggle between Good and Evil” in all three great monotheistic religions, but 
“Islam’s problem” is that it never got rid of the dangerous implications this has because it 
did not experience anything similar to the Enlightenment and subsequent separation of 
church and state. Now that the Muslim world has been subjugated on a global scale, it is 
regarded as inevitable that Muslims continue their 14 centuries-old struggle between East 
and West, Islam and (post-) Christianity. Regardless of what the West does, this struggle 
will rage until “more tolerant Islamic traditions” prevail. Such is the argument of Bernard 
Lewis in his famous Roots of Muslim Rage.7  
The reasoning of Lewis and like-minded writers completely ignores the socio-
economic factors that drive people against their current regimes and against the West, 
which is regarded as an exploitive power. Neither does it pay attention to political factors 
like the fact that these regimes are known to be corrupt and not to offer much chance for 
a fast growing population. Most importantly for this discussion, Lewis downgrades the 
importance of concrete Western civilizing pressure. A first attempt to put the current 
widespread hating of the West in its historical background and “trace their historical 
roots” is Ian Burumas and Avishai Margalits recent published work Occidentalism: The                                                  
6  See Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West, p. 14-15. “Militant and revolutionary Islam, however, 
appears to recognize no boundaries between the private and the public domains and attempts to 
regulate the totality of individual and collective life. It is viewed as a totalitarian – an antidemocratic 
and anti-Western creed. It is backward looking and xenophobic, which makes it fear Western ideas and 
presence. It opposes Western presence in the Muslim lands and challenges the West’s global 
supremacy. The Islam that preaches this is the nemesis of Western civilization.”  
7  Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, in The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266 (1990), no. 3, pp. 47-60; 
an extended version is published recently: Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy 
Terror, New York 2004 
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West in the Eyes of Its Enemies.8 Buruma/Margalit coin the expression “Occidentalism” 
to describe “the dehumanizing picture of the West painted by its enemies”.9 Using 
examples of German, Japanese, and Russian ant-Western philosophy, they try “to 
understand what drives Occidentalism”.10 The aim of this paper is to widen this much 
needed historical perspective in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
contemporary Western conceptualization of the al-Qaeda and Taliban threat as a “clash of 
civilizations”. A comparison with the historical Boxer phenomenon may in particular 
help to examine the Western impact on the Islamic world, the Western cultural pressure 
and its consequences. 
Although there can be no doubt about the fact that both phenomena are the results 
of unique and complex historical processes, a precise comparison of these differing 
incidents separated by less than 100 years opens our eyes for the specifically new and 
unique elements of the current challenge to the West. A historical comparison of the 
West's reaction to the Boxer Rebellion with the efforts by the USA and its allies to 
counteract the al-Qaeda terror network and the Taliban, who provided it with protection 
and a safe haven, therefore also permits further judgments about the chances of success 
for the approaches to a solution so far pursued by the West. 
                                                 
8  Ian Buruma/Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies, New York 2004. 
9  Ibid, p. 5. 
10  Ibid, p. 11. 
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II. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
A. THE WEST – THEN AND NOW 
 
In this thesis, reference is made to an uprising against “the West”, and so this term 
needs to be defined more precisely and rendered as a hypothesis. Above all, we need 
clarification of whether and, if so, why the Western states were sensed as a threat at the 
beginning of both the previous and also the present century. Regardless of this, it is a 
question of recognizing that “the West” as a uniform bloc of albeit independent and self-
supporting, but finally replaceable states does not exist.11 Hence, the idea of “the West“ 
seems problematic.12 Despite all they have in common, the incidents following 9/11 and 
after the second Gulf War have made clear that the West appears to be a long way away 
from a unified policy.  
Although no consensus exists as to a definition of the West, scholars of the 
subject typically acknowledge its derivation from three distinct sources: the classical 
culture of Greece and Rome, the Christian religion - particularly Western Christianity, 
and the Enlightenment of the modern era. The conflicts, creative tensions, and unstable 
equilibrium among the West’s three constitute some of the most distinctive features of 
the West. Individual and community, faith and reason, liberty and law, market and 
society – all coexist as a series of uneasy pairings. Of course, variants of these four 
tensions have existed within most societies, and in some senses they are universal. Only 
in the West, however, have they been embodied and sustained in separate political 
institutions and social elites over long periods of time.13 
The differences among the Western states can be seen in a closer comparison. 
Whereas Great Britain, the USA and France developed parliamentary democracies by the 
end of the 19th century, Russia was still an autocratically shaped country in which the 
czar ruled to a great extent absolutely. The German Reich and Italy were mixed forms 
having elected parliaments and crowned heads of state, whose throne was hereditary. In 
                                                 
11  See Buruma/Margalit, Occidentalism. 
12  See Maja Zehfuss, Forget September 11, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 24 (2003), No. 3, pp. 513-528. 
13  See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston 
1944. 
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Great Britain's empire, which was based on unique marine power, the sun never set. After 
its expansion, Russia became an Asiatic power since the 17th century, but essentially 
remained a purely land power. After defeat in the German-French War, France expanded 
its own colonial empire, during which it repeatedly got into conflicts of interest with 
Great Britain, the other major colonial power. The USA completed the annexation of the 
North American continent and became a colonial power with the annexation of the 
Philippines, although it maintained its anti-colonial rhetoric from the days of the War of 
Independence.14 The German Reich rose to become the greatest power in Central Europe 
following its unification, but it was only able to undertake naval competition with Great 
Britain in a half-hearted way due to its geographical location and thus remained, above 
all, a territorial and second-class colonial power, despite all its efforts.15 
Developments that followed could lead to a mistaken merit in talking of the 
“West” with great justification now than at that time. However, the Western states 
probably formed a more harmonious cultural and political unit on the eve of the Boxer 
Uprising than nowadays, despite the mutual deep lack of trust and the enormous conflicts 
of interest among the European powers. At the end of the 19th century, the degree of 
intermeshing and of cultural and economic exchange between the Western states was 
higher than in the 1960's.16 Europe had already become a global civilization in the course 
of its aggressive colonization policy to a degree quite similar to today’s. The international 
system of states created by Europe, an “international society that was universal in the 
sense that it covered all the world” additionally developed.17 The European nations 
                                                 
14  See Stuart Creighton Miller, “Benevolent Assimilation”. The American Conquest of the Philippines, 
1899-1903, New Haven 1982. 
15  See Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought. Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War, New York 
1991. 
16  See John Maynard Keynes eloquent and oft-cited description of the pre-World War I economy: “What 
an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in 
August, 1914! […] Life offered, at a low cost and with the least trouble, conveniences, comforts, and 
amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other ages. The inhabitant 
of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole 
earth. […] he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural 
resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world. […] But, most important of all, he regarded 
this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, 
and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable.” John Maynard Keynes, Economic 
Consequences of the Peace, London 1919. 
17  Bull, The Revolt Against the West, p. 217. 
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became “a diplomatic club with a new set of rules: the law of nations.”18 The European 
nations set legal and economic standards and were resolved to assert their universal 
validity, even with force if need be, as the example of the Boxer Uprising made clear. 
Europe determined the form and function of international law as it saw fit and for its own 
benefit. According to Hedley Bull, the dominance of the European or Western powers at 
the turn of the century  
 
was expressed not only in their economic and military power and in their 
commanding intellectual and cultural authority but also in the rules and 
institutions of international society. This society was seen as an 
association of mainly European and Christian states, to which outside 
political communities could be admitted only if and when they met the 
criteria for membership laid down by the founding members as Japan by 
1900 was widely deemed to have done and China not yet to have done. 
The rules of international law which then prevailed had been made, for the 
most part, by these European or Western states, which had consented to 
them through custom or treaties concluded among themselves; […] The 
international legal rules, moreover, were not only made by the European 
or Western powers, they were also in substantial measure made for them: 
part, at least, of the content of the then existing international law […] 
served to facilitate the maintenance of European or Western ascendancy.19 
 
Nevertheless, the Western states appear superficially to be a lot more 
homogeneous today than they were in 1900. The USA and the states of the EU share 
similar democratic forms of government and are alliance partners in a joint security and 
defense organization, NATO. Not least thanks to its solidarity, the West was able to 
banish the threat of communism and to decide the Cold War for itself. But it is precisely 
in the current battle against Islamistic terror that great differences among the Western 
powers can be seen. What appears new about this is less and less a difference of opinion 
about influence and political objectives than differences in mentality.20 The West appears 
no longer to be able to come to an agreement about how the world is to be ordered and 
the circumstances under which military force can be justified. In a highly regarded essay, 
                                                 
18  Michael Freeman, Human Rights, Asian Values and the Clash of Civilizations, Issues & Studies, Vol. 
34 (1998), no. 10, pp. 48-78, p. 54.  
19  Bull, The Revolt Against the West, p. 217. 
20  See Steven Everts, Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe? Managing Divergence in Transatlantic 
Foreign Policy, Working paper, Centre for European Reform, February 2001. 
8 
Robert Kagan insinuates that the European powers no longer regard force as an 
admissible means of politics and exclusively stress international law, negotiations and 
international cooperation. Whereas the USA continue to be convinced of the validity of 
an anarchic world view and the necessity of realist politics connected with this, the 
Europeans, Kagan polemicists, have increasingly gone into a “post-historical paradise of 
peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s 'Perpetual Peace'.”21 The reasons 
for the increasing drift apart of Europe and the USA are to be found long in the past. The 
West is in the process of losing its unity, says Kagan: 
 
That is why on major strategic and international questions today, 
Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on 
little and understand one another less and less. And this state of affairs is 
not transitory – the product of one American election or one catastrophic 
event. The reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in 
development, and likely to endure. When it comes to setting national 
priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and 
implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe 
have parted ways.22 
 
Kagan's criticism, even if justified, does not answer the question whether these 
rupture lines within the West are also perceived from the outside. For the Boxer Uprising, 
we can state with great certainty that a differentiation of the West by the Chinese did not 
take place. Europeans and Americans, even Japanese, were equated to a great extent and 
generalized as “foreign devils”. As a matter of fact, “in their attitudes to other peoples 
[…] the Western powers displayed a measure of unity, of which a striking expression on 
1900 was their intervention in China to suppress the Boxer Rising.”23  
Although al-Qaeda has made a number of efforts to separate the USA from the 
European allies by promises and threats, there can be little doubt that Islamistic terror 
hardly makes the effort to differentiate and mainly perceives the West as a monolithic, 
and hostile bloc. Osama bin Laden's ultimatum of April 2004 and Spain's reaction to the 
                                                 
21  Robert Kagan, Power and weakness, Policy Review, 113, p.  
22  Ibid. 
23  See Bull, The Revolt Against the West, p. 220. 
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attacks of 3/11 make no change to this attitude.24 In any case, the USA is regarded as the 
spearhead of globalization and thus as the main representatives of the Western threat. In 
his article Global Triumph or Western Twilight?, James Kurth makes the special position 
of the USA as the “sole superpower,” the leading nation in information technology and as 
the most progressive post-modern society in the Western world his subject. “If America 
is the fulfillment of the West”, he draws his balance, “then the triumph of America in the 
world is the triumph of the West.”25 So the essential fact remains is that knowledge of 
whether the West actually forms a unit only has a slight influence. On the other hand, the 
fact that it is only perceived as such from the outside is of decisive importance.26 
Back in 1897, the noted naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that the 
coming century was likely to see a conflict of civilizations, specifically between the West 
and East. The rise of the non-West, in particular East Asia, was bound to challenge 
Western supremacy in world affairs. This, however, was an inevitable outcome of the 
coming closer together of peoples and races, which itself had been made possible by 
modern technological advances that established a “multiplication of communication” 
throughout the world. A non-West untouched by modern civilization was no threat to 
Western civilization, but a modernized East, Mahan believed, clearly was. To cope with 
this coming crisis, it would be imperative for the Western powers to ensure that non-
Western peoples become spiritually as well as materially westernized. But if such 
prospect could not be counted upon, and Mahan was very pessimistic in this regard, then 
the West would have no choice but to strengthen its military in preparation for the 
expected onslaught by non-West.27 
                                                 
24  In an audiotape a speaker claiming to be Osama bin Laden offered a truce with Europe. It said that any 
state in Europe that stopped “attacking Muslims or interfering in their affairs” would be spared al-
Qaida operations, but offered no such deal to the United States. “Bin Laden” offers Europe truce, 
http://new.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3627775.stm, last visited on May 1, 2004. 
25  James Kurth, Global Triumph or Western Twilight, in Orbis 45, 3 (2001), pp. 333-341, p. 337. 
26  James Kurth, The War and the West, Orbis, Vol. 46 (2002), no. 2, pp. 321-332, p. 321: „The war is 
actually one between Western nations (who think themselves as being less Western than they really 
are) and Islamic terrorists (who think of themselves as being more representative of Islam than they 
really are). But because the war involves nations that are both Western in fact and Western in the 
minds of the Islamist terrorists, it engages the West. The way that the leading nation of the West, the 
United States, wages this war will be greatly shaped by the nature of Western civilization.” 
27  Abstract taken from Akira Iriye, The End of the Century: Emerging Themes, Disappearing Themes, 
Issues & Studies, Vol. 34 (1998), no. 10, pp. 10-24, p. 11. 
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Mahan’s conclusions seem to have stood the test of time. Although the means by 
which Western civilization claims dominance over the world have changed since the end 
of the 19th century, the effect in the present is similar. Then as now, the West is perceived 
above all as an alien civilization by other countries of the world, the innovative power 
and vitality of which is sensed as a threat, exercising a high pressure of transformation. 
Even a Europe that relies less on military power than on the power of international law 
and international cooperation in the concert of states propagates a system that declares 
Western values and standards to be universal. Samuel Huntington therefore draws the 
conclusion: 
 
The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defense. 
It is the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the 
universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, 
power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout 
the world. These are the basic ingredients that fuel conflict between Islam 
and the West.28 
 
Bernard Lewis sees things similarly in his recently published study The Crisis of 
Islam. According to him, Moslem hatred is less a result of the rejection of certain 
interests, actions, political measures or individual states, but of the rejection of the 
Western civilization per se. The actual hatred of the Moslems is aimed at principles and 
values to which the West confesses and which run counter to the core of Moslem 
civilization.29 Immediately after the terror attacks of 9/11, Norman Podhoertz exclaimed 
in the Wall Street Journal that a “barbaric culture had declared war not because of our 
policies but for what we stood for – democracy and freedom.”30 The Islamist’s campaign 
is rooted in a visceral hatred and contempt for Western civilization as such and 
resentment at its global ascendancy.  
Then as now, the West should not only become conscious of its impact, but also 
gain the insight that it is confronted with a civilization that is convinced of the superiority 
of its own civilization to an equal extent and that understands itself as the spearhead of 
                                                 
28  Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York 1996, p. 
217-218. 
29  Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. 26. 
30  Norman Podhoertz, Israel Is Not the Issue, Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2001. 
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the development of humanity. This self-perception of the Chinese and Moslem 
civilization is the object of the examination which now follows. 
 
 
B. THE HERITAGE OF PAST GREATNESS 
 
The West's expansion and civilization pressure since the 18th century increasingly 
caused the necessity of modernization and westernization of the societies in other regions 
of the world.31 However, the ability to react to this threat differed among the countries 
affected, as can be seen from a comparison of two societies with a Confucian character: 
Japan and China. Essentially, non-Western countries had three alternatives. They were 
able to adopt the model of the West completely and bring about both a modernization and 
also a westernization of their societies. This was rare. Instead, most cultures restricted 
themselves to carrying out a partial modernization, above all in the military field.32 A 
radical transformation of society on a Western basis, i.e. a take-over of Western political 
and social institutions, was regularly resisted by the understandable wish to maintain 
cultural identity. This limited adaptation was quite obvious, as the military/technical 
superiority of the West left hardly any doubt about the necessity of a change, but Western 
civilization was rejected as being alien and unfitting. The third and most radical reaction 
to the challenge of the West was a rigorous rejection of both facets of Western expansion. 
Neither the achievements of modern Western society nor the civilization of the West 
were recognized as being exemplary and worth aiming at. 
                                                 
31  See Buruma/Margalit, Occidentalism, p. 38. 
32  For the Muslim countries see John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat. Myth or Reality, 3rd ed., New York 
1999, p. 75: “while most [Muslim states] looked to the West for the basis of their systems of modern 
constitutional government, law, and education, they have also injected Islamic provisions into their 
constitutions, requiring that the head of state be a Muslim or that Islamic law be recognized as a source 
of law.” For China see Buruma/Avishai, Occidentalism, p. 38-39: “Chinese imperial rule was justified 
by a cosmic order. China was in the centre of the world, and the dragon throne occupied the spiritual 
and political centre of the Chinese empire. The scientific challenge of this cosmic order, imported from 
the West, was apolitical challenge as well. And so, of course, were liberalism, individualism, and 
Christianity. The rejection of these Western influences, more often than not, was a defense of a 
monopoly of power, of the divine monarch and his courtiers. So the nineteenth-century Chinese 
establishment scholars found an indigenous formula: Western knowledge for practical matters, such as 
weaponry, and Chinese learning for spiritual and moral affairs.”    
12 
The Boxer Movement and also modern Moslem extremism shared radical 
rejection as a joint characteristic. This lack of willingness and ability for transformation 
can only be explained by reference to a self-image marked by past historical greatness. 
Both Chinese civilization and the Moslem world had been able to develop a sense of 
superiority of civilization over the West with a certain justification. The fact that the 
West, regarded as barbaric and uncivilized, could not only catch up with their own level 
of development, but also even overtake their own civilization, was basically 
unimaginable, as both the Chinese civilization as well as the Moslem world conferred the 
top position inside the development of humanity to themselves per definition, albeit for 
differing reasons. Falling behind the West could therefore only be a temporary matter and 
the only explanation for short-term failure was treason.33  
So if Chinese and Islamic civilizations are similar in their postulated superiority 
compared with the West, they fundamentally differ in two regards, and it is precisely 
these differences which make the challenge of the West by modern Islamism appear 
particularly threatening. Unlike Chinese civilization, Islam overcomes borders of races 
and states and was therefore able to develop a universal claim from the outset.34  
 
Both Christianity and Islam claimed a universal mission; each was a 
transnational community based upon common belief and a vocation to be an 
example to the nations of the world, the vehicle fort he spread and triumph of 
God’s kingdom.35 
 
On this point, Islam and Christianity are similar. The theological similarities of 
Christendom and Islam, however, put the two on a collision course. Each believes in the 
history of God’s revelation and that its revelation and messenger marked the end of 
revelation and prophecy. Both have an urge to world-wide evangelism across the barriers 
of peoples and races as a common point, whereas the Chinese Empire tended to set up 
increasingly higher barriers between its own cultural territory as the assumed “center” of 
                                                 
33  See Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West p. 12: “Islam is a proselytizing creed with a belief in its 
own ultimate victory and universal prevalence, no matter how serious the tribulations of the journey.” 
34  See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York 1992, p. 45: “The appeal of 
Islam is potential universal, reaching out to all mean as mean, and not just to members of a particular 
ethnic or national group.” 
35  Esposito, The Islamic Threat, p. 36. 
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the world and the uncultivated, “barbaric” peoples on its periphery.36 Bassam Tibi 
summarizes this dilemma as follows:  
 
Islam has become the West’s leading challenger for one simple reason: […] 
Islamic perspectives are not restricted to national or regional boundaries. In 
this respect, Islam resembles Western civilization, in the sense that it is 
universal in both its claims and its outlook. It is thus easy to understand why 
Islam and the West clash, more consistently than do other competing 
civilizations. Unlike Western civilization, however, Islam, though universal, 
has not been able to spread the da’wa/Islamic mission throughout the world. 
[…] In fact, the concept of world order posed by these fundamentalists 
competes with Western universalism.37 
 
On the other hand, the historical dimensions of the inter-cultural conflict differed. 
China regarded Europe's powers as peripheral, insignificant and under no circumstances 
on a par. If anything, they might become vassals obliged to pay tribute until the middle of 
the 19th century, when this opponent rose to become a deadly threat. Unlike this, the 
confrontation between the West and the Muslim world has a history of 1,300 years. The 
Western and Muslim worlds share a long, joint history, marked by conflict, mutual 
stimulation, religious ignorance and prejudices. It stands to reason to look for a cause of 
why the Moslem world feels so humiliated by the current superiority of Western 
civilization in precisely these years of familiarity. 
 
1. “The Middle Kingdom” and the Western Barbarians at the Periphery 
 
By the middle of the 19th century, the Manchu Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1911), the 
last phase of China’s ancient régime, reached a crossroads and entered a phase of decline. 
Nevertheless, the political system that it had created over an extended period was still 
capable of preserving political stability. Yet, Western imperialism finally brought about 
                                                 
36  See Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West, p. 12: “Islam cuts across continents, nationalities, and 
ethnic groups and thus besides Christianity is the only other global religion. None of the other 
candidates – such as Confucianism – for the role of the West’s antagonist seems to match Islam as a 
system of beliefs, values, and guides for socio-political organization; they are too nebulous and 
unstructured. Confucianism is relevant only to China although it is influential in other parts of East 
Asia.” 
37  Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism, Political Islam and the New World Order, Berkeley 
1998, p. 15. 
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the disintegration of traditional institutions and Confucian culture. Ironically, it was the 
relatively greater stability of the Manchu dynasty38 and Chinese traditional society that 
made it difficult for China to modernize as quickly as Japan, where a kind of aristocratic 
revolution from above made non-traditional responses and a Western-type overall 
transformation possible.39 Unlike their predecessors, the Ch’ing, however, did not give 
way to a new reform in the pattern of the dynastic cycle but to a nearly complete 
decentralization of political power and the lack of internal leadership that characterized 
the warlord era. It was the convergence and interplay of internal factors with the Western 
imperialism after 1840 that eventually brought about the downfall of the Ch’ing dynasty, 
whereas the disintegration of traditional Chinese constitutions and Confucian values was 
caused by Western influence alone.40  
The longest lived and most populous polity in world history had changed so 
slowly over millennia that sometimes it seemed not to have changed at all. Then suddenly 
and nearly simultaneously, China was struck with equivalents of the enlightenment, the 
French Revolution and industrialization. Thus, as in the Islamic world today, Western 
intruders exerted disruptive influence on Chinese society, threatening the traditional 
economic system, elite prerogatives, and the Chinese world order. Moreover the Western 
powers became a danger to China’s security and sovereignty. Defeating China in two 
wars (the Opium War 1840 and the Arrow War 1858-1860), they began to undermine the 
very foundations of the imperial system – the self-sufficiency of the agricultural 
economy, the bonds of the family system, the ideology of the classics, and the empire-
tribute system – which had given the Chinese civilization its amazing cultural 
continuity.41 
                                                 
38  See John K. Fairbank/Edwin O. Reischauer/Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition & Transformation, 
revised edition, Boston 1989, p. 211: “In studying their [the Manchu] achievement, however, we 
cannot help wondering to what extent their very success in maintaining the traditional order may have 
been a factor in its later collapse. So well established was the Chinese tradition that a thoroughgoing 
change of institutions and values could not easily be imagined. The Manchu were more successful as 
inheritors than as innovators; it was not in them to remake the Chinese scheme of things.” 
39  See Peter Duus, Modern Japan, Boston and New York 1998. 
40  See Paul Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese 
Past, New York 1984. 
41  See Frederic Wakeman, The Fall of Imperial China, New York 1975, pp. 135-142. 
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The initial reaction of China’s ruling Confucian intellectuals in the decade of the 
1860’s was to reinvigorate the old social order by reforms in the traditional manner and to 
strengthen the country against the menace of the Western powers by utilizing the very 
technological advances that had placed China at the mercy of Western imperialism. The 
objects of the reforms had been to insure the continued existence of the old order in the 
face of Western imperialism.42 China’s intellectuals thus used the same tactics as the 
Islamists today. These efforts failed miserably. China’s “response to the West” and 
China’s responses to internal Chinese political conditions were inseparably linked. In the 
short lapse of time granted to China to create a modern industry and to renovate its 
military, between 1864 and 1894, it had simultaneously to end revolts, re-establish its 
authority in central Asia, make good all the destruction, and struggle on all sides against 
attacks from outside. Public opinion and important parts of the government were afraid 
that the creation of factories, mines, and railways would increase the hold of foreign 
capital on the Chinese economy, increase unemployment, and strengthen the power of the 
regional governors at the expense of the central authorities. In the matter of reforming and 
modernization, China tended to reject through xenophobic reflex what it would have 
accepted had it been more independent. Thus the Western intrusion not only caused in the 
long run the collapse of the traditional order but also prevented indirectly any attempts for 
reform. Again, the similarities with the Islamic world are evident.  
The area in which even restoration officials accepted the need for innovation along 
Western lines best was the reorganization of China’s military. Again, military 
modernization needed not disturb the equilibrium of the traditional society. But any 
modernized army with a competent officer corps would have disrupted the very social 
order the new army were designed to protect. The question was whether it was possible in 
general for the new to exist alongside the old and not exert strong pressure for further 
change.43 The premise that revival of Confucian values and institutions could provide 
strength and stability was erroneous because China was slowly being westernized in spite 
                                                 
42  See Richard J. Smith, China’s Cultural Heritage: The Qing Dynasty, 1644-1912, 2nd ed., Boulder 1994, 
p. 285: “Naturally enough, the conservative Manchu government did nothing to encourage the 
Westernization of Chinese culture during the nineteenth century. The Manchu had, after all, originally 
justified their conquest in terms of the protection of China’s cultural heritage. They could therefore 
scarcely appear to abandon traditional values, practices, and institutions without compromising their 
political position.” 
43  See ibid, p. 288. 
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of bureaucratic decisions. Dynamic forces for change were beginning to nibble away at the 
foundations of the Confucian system.44 
One of the major obstacles to modernization along Western patterns for both 
China and the Islamic world was (is) their strong confidence in the superiority of its 
culture and civilization. China saw itself as the cultural center of the universe and 
regarded all non-Chinese as “uncivilized” barbarians.45 This belief was reflected in the 
Chinese name for their country as “The Central Kingdom” or “The Middle Kingdom.” 
The Chinese ruler, “the Son of Heaven,” was considered the ruler of all mankind; all 
other “barbarian” rulers were mere local chieftains owing allegiance to Peking.46 Hence, 
there could be no Western-style diplomatic relations. As Frederic Wakeman states in his 
work The Fall of Imperial China: 
 
all barbarians were placed beneath the Chinese in an ideal world order of 
which their empire was the Central Kingdom (Chung-kuo). China alone 
was thought to represent true civilization; only its ruler, the Son of heaven, 
deserved to sit at the apex of the hierarchy of earthly monarchs. Korean 
kings, Annamese monarchs, and Japanese emperors all ruled in their own 
right, but within the Confucian hierarchy they were ranked as younger 
brothers of the Chinese emperor, who was expected to ratify their 
investitures. People who failed to observe the Confucian rites of monarchy 
were placed much lower in the hierarchy, so that like a great ladder of 
being the entire world order descended from higher civilization to the 
lower rungs of barbarism.47 
 
Over the whole 18th century, the Ch’ing dynasty felt unrivalled. Never in history 
had the Chinese enjoyed such general security and power as during the middle years of 
the 18th century, the great “Indian summer” of their traditional history.48 However, the 
pax sinica that the Manchu offered China had some serious side effects because it 
                                                 
44  Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, New York/London 1990, p. 140. 
45  See Smith, China’s Cultural Heritage, p. 137: “The Chinese views of other peoples, which evolved 
over many centuries of extensive contact with foreigners […] was based on the essentially 
unchallenged idea of China’s cultural superiority to all other states.” 
46  See Buruma/Margalit, Occidentalism, p. 38. 
47  Wakeman, The Fall of Imperial China, p. 111. 
48  See Fairbank/Reischauer/Craig, East Asia, p. 211: “The Ch’ing period saw both the zenith and the 
nadir of the traditional Chinese state. In the eighteenth century the population and territory of the 
empire were the largest they had ever been, and the finesse and stability of administration were at high 
point.” 
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demanded self-restraint, maintenance and consolidation rather than initiative and 
exploration. In contrast to the Chōshū and Satsuma leaders in Japan or the Islamists in the 
Muslim world, the Manchu as an alien dynasty could not easily mobilize national and 
patriotic feelings to support attempts at modernization. By doing so, they unavoidably ran 
the risk of creating a danger for their own foreign rule, as the Boxer Rebellion proved.49 
China reacted not as a cultural subunit but as a large ethnocentric universe that 
remained quite sure of its cultural superiority, even if relatively inferior in military 
power. China refused to accept that Western aggression could become a question of 
survival. For the most of the 19th century, the Ch’ing seems to have been too weak 
militarily to protect itself from imperialism, but too strong culturally to surrender political 
initiative to Western-oriented modernizers. In fact, the long twilight of the tributary 
system helps explain China’s lack of a sustained sense of crisis and its lingering Sino-
centrism. Traditional concepts and explanations were all too effective in distorting 
reality. 
It was only a matter of time until the expansive, aggressive West, incapable of 
being contained within the Chinese traditional system of “tribute and trade,” shattered the 
walls raised by China. The Treaty of Tientsin (1858) and the Convention of Peking 
(1860), which ended the first series of clashes with these Western countries, established 
formal equality between the rulers of China and Western powers.50 By doing so, the 
Chinese claim that the “Mandate of Heaven” was global ended. The treaty undermined 
the ideological sanction of dynastic rule, a first step in the destruction of Chinese 
traditional imperial order. Moreover, the Opium War was not only broke down Chinese 
barriers against Western free trade and the acceptance of Western norms of state relations 
and international laws, as the West saw it. It was also the clash of two opposed political 
systems: the traditional world order of imperial China and the international order of 
nation-states that had emerged in the West since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. When 
China was forced to open to the free flow of Western trade, when the Chinese 
government was forced to accept foreign nations on equal terms, and when Chinese law 
                                                 
49  See Smith, China’s Cultural Heritage, p. 289: “Despite their reform efforts, the Manchus became 
increasingly scorned and despised for their inability either to resist imperialism or to protect elite 
interests. Chinese nationalism no longer permitted alien rulers to claim legitimacy as the protectors of 
China’s cultural heritage.” 
50  See Wakeman, The Fall of Imperial China, p. 137-139. 
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and sovereignty judicial authority was discarded with respect to foreigners in China, the 
concept of the “Mandate of Heaven” was fatally affected.51 The Opium War and the 
Treaty of Nanking signaled the end of the imperial era because in its aftermath the 
imperial powers not only obtained more and more concessions within China but also 
began to interfere in the imperial government’s control over the dependent areas of 
empire.52 
At various points in their history, the Chinese had been able to accept being 
tutored in the arts of war by “barbarians.” China’s leadership, however, could not accept 
that military modernization along Western lines also required an overall reform of 
traditional society, economy and state.53 The creation of new military institutions to deal 
with the Western countries was therefore only accepted as a temporary step.54 Thus, even 
in those areas in which the reformers achieved some progressive changes, the generally 
noninnovative character of the Chinese policy in the 19th century was never challenged. 
In short, unable and unwilling to undertake fundamental or even revolutionary 
reform steps, the Manchus sought salvation in a revival of Confucian values and 
institutions. Facing Western industrialized countries, that believed in social Darwinism 
and in a race between the nations, such a restoration of the traditional Chinese order was 
impossible because the requirements of a modern Chinese state able to resist Western 
imperialism proved to run directly counter to the requirements of the traditional 
Confucian order. Throughout its history, China has often shown a deep conservatism in 
regard to social, political, and economic change. Political and social innovations were 
                                                 
51  See Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 4th edition, New York 1990, pp. 168-219. 
52  See Ranbir Vohra, China’s Path to Modernization: A Historical Review from 1800 to the Present, 
Englewood Cliffs 1987, p. 64: “The competition between imperialist powers in China spilled over into 
the states on the periphery of China, resulting in weakening China in another unexpected way. The 
concept of the Central (Middle) Kingdom was good as long as China was surrounded by the ring of 
tributary states […] By 1895 many of these states were removed from China’s orbit, thus destroying 
the world order in which China was ‘central’.“ 
53  See ibid, p. 76: “Even when it became an open secret that the Western military was superior to that of 
China, an attempt was made so separate ‘guns and ships’ from the Western civilization an polity that 
had produced these instruments of aggression.” 
54  Prince Kung and his associates underlined the temporary character of the reform efforts in their 
memorial requesting the establishment of the Tsungli Yamen: “As soon as the military campaigns are 
concluded and the affairs of the various countries are simplified, the new office will be abolished and 
its functions will […] revert to the Grand Council for management so as to accord with the old 
system.” Cited in Teng Ssu-yü and John K. Fairbank, China’s Response to the West: A Documentary 
Survey, 1839-1923, Cambridge 1979, p. 48.  
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embedded within traditional patterns in order to legitimate their implementation.55 The 
military and economic pressure of Western imperialism challenged China in a unique 
way and in doing so, created a crisis of such magnitude that no choice was left than to 
abandon cultural and political conservatism. Though the traditional Chinese world may 
have seemed the best of all worlds to the ruling group in China, it was no longer a 
possible one.  
 
2. The Islamic Divine Order and the Empire of the True Believers 
 
The tendency currently observed in a number of Moslem countries toward 
political radicalization of religion, to Islamism, has its origins in the gradual decline of 
the Islamic civilization and in the feeling of a continued humiliation by the West. The 
same attitude of high and modern civilization that the West currently claims for itself was 
one which Arabs and Ottomans assumed against medieval Europe, including the claim to 
modern state forms and economic as well as technical leadership. One of the explanations 
for the Islamists' anger is therefore finding oneself in the opposite situation nowadays. 
In his video message of October 7, 2001, Osama bin Laden justified the attacks of 
September 11 with the continued humiliation of the Moslem world by the West: “What 
America is tasting now is only a copy of what we have tasted. Our Islamic nation has 
been tasting the same for more than 80 years of humiliation and disgrace, its sons killed 
and their blood spilled, its sanctities desecrate.”56  As early as 1990, Bernard Lewis 
distinguished three levels of this Moslem humiliation in his famous essay The Roots of 
Muslim Rage: 
 
For a long time now there has been a rising tide of rebellion against this 
Western paramountcy, and a desire to reassert Muslim values and restore 
Muslim greatness. The Muslim has suffered successive stages of defeat. 
The first was his loss of domination in the world, to the advancing power 
                                                 
55  See Fairbank/Reischauer/Craig, East Asia, p. 178: “One factor creating stability was the Chinese view 
of history as ‘change within tradition’. The leaders of society were devoted to tradition; anything that 
happened in the present had to be fitted into the rich pattern of experience inherited from the past. 
Instead of the ideal of progress, which Westerners today have inherited from the nineteenth century, 
the Chinese of the Ming and Ch’ing saw their models far in the past.” 
56  Cited after Bruce Lincoln, Holy terrors, p. 102. 
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of Russia and the West. The second was the undermining of his authority 
in his own country, through an invasion of foreign ideas and laws and 
ways of life and sometimes even foreign ruler or settlers, and the 
enfranchisement of native non-Muslim elements. The third - the last straw 
– was the challenge to his mastery in his own house, from emancipated 
women and rebellious children. It was too much to endure, and the 
outbreak of rage against these alien, infidel, and incomprehensible forces 
that has subverted his dominance, disrupted his society, and finally 
violated the sanctuary of his home was inevitable.57 
 
Unlike Christianity, Islam is both a religion and also a model for society.58 
Therefore, the Moslem world also does not recognize the separation of state and church. 
Mohammed in his capacity as a prophet was both the founder of a religion and a secular 
founder of a state who declared and made war, concluded treaties, set and spoke law. 
According to a known formula, Islam is “religion and state” (al-Islam din wa-daula) or, 
to put it more generally, “religion and world“ (din wa-dunya): no area of life can 
withdraw from its power.59 Although this ideal of the extensive obligingness of Islamic 
values and standards was undermined in practice at an early stage, it was hardly 
questioned on a theoretical level.60 
Islam had no reformation like the one in Christian Europe in the 16th century. As 
Ahmed Hasim says in his paper The World According to Osama bin Laden, “the very 
notion” of the term is “theoretically alien to the Islamic community, or Umma.”61 
Therefore, it can be no surprise that Moslem perception of themselves and others are still 
                                                 
57  Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, p. 49. 
58  See Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism, p. 3: “In fact, Islam is both a world religion and a major 
civilization.” 
59  See Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West, p. 11: “Islam is a communal religion and, as such, in 
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60  See Akhavi, Islam and the West in World History, p. 547: “In its first 10 years (622-632) the Islamic 
community was ruled by the Prophet, who acted as both the religious and temporal leader of the 
Muslims. His early successors continued at this, but gradually the two spheres came to be separated in 
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61  Ahmed S. Hashim, The World According to Usama Bin Laden, in Naval War College Review, 54, 4 
(2001), pp. 11-35, p. 16. 
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primarily of a religious character. Whereas the Chinese substantiated their special 
position within humanity with their higher civilization, the Moslems deduce it from the 
circumstance that only they are in possession of true belief.62 As the founder of the 
religion and the state, Mohammed received his commission directly from the one and 
only God. The Moslem civilization was, in the end, divinely inspired and must 
accordingly be superior to all other, secular civilizations. Bernard Lewis describes this 
particular Muslim worldview and its concept of world order with the words: 
 
In the classical Islamic view, to which many Muslims are beginning to 
return, the world and all mankind are divided into two: the world and all 
mankind are divided into two; The House of Islam, where the Muslim law 
and faith prevail, and the rest, known as the House of unbelief or the 
House of War, which it is the duty of Muslims ultimately to bring to 
Islam. […] The Muslim world in its heyday saw itself as the center of 
truth and enlightenment, surrounded by infidel barbarians whom it would 
in due enlighten and civilize.63 
 
Unlike China, the actual inferiority of the Moslem civilization and the increasing 
dominance of the West did not manifest themselves suddenly, but were a creeping 
process. At the end of the first millennium, Islam enjoyed an incomparable triumphant 
advance.64 From Mohammed's area of work on the Arabian Peninsula, the Moslem Arabs 
spread to Central Asia, North Africa and even Spain, creating a blossoming society and 
culture. The great empire of the Arabs collapsed in 1258 with the fall of Baghdad in the 
attack by the Mongolians and was replaced by rule from the outside and suppression. The 
fate of the Islamic world from then on was increasingly in the hands of the Ottomans, 
who came from Turkey. After the conquest of Constantinople in 1452, the Turkish Sultan 
                                                 
62  See Esposito, The Islamic Threat, p. 24: “Muslims believe that God first sent His revelation to the Jews 
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carried the banner of Islam into the world. Under Suleyman the Splendid (1520-1566), 
the Ottomans ousted the Christians from the Aegean Sea, and in the mid-16th century, 
they twice tried to capture Malta, the gate to the Western Mediterranean.65 They 
expanded their power to the Balkan, captured Baghdad in 1521 and Rhodes, the 
important outpost of the Christians in the Mediterranean, in 1522, and they were outside 
the capital of the Hapsburgs, Vienna, for the first time in 1529. Then and also in 1683, 
the Turks were prevented from subjecting a center of Western culture at the last minute 
by a unified Western world. 
The decline of imperial China is primarily to be put down to a general social and 
political rigidity, whereas the Islamic world lost its lead over the West in civilization and 
power politics by religious orthodoxy. Whereas the Europeans increasingly took over the 
inheritance of Greek philosophy and sciences from the Arabs and the Persians in the late 
middle Ages, revolutionizing their own view of the world and granting free thinkers 
greater development in this way, conservative theologians in the Orient began to oust 
thinking open to the world from the schools and universities. They only considered 
sciences to be desirable to the extent that they did not come into conflict with the 
interpretation of the Koran by spiritual scholars of law. Thomas Aquinas, the great 
theologian of the Catholic Middle Ages, published a similar guideline: science was to be 
a “maid” of theology. In the European renaissance, this relationship radically reversed. 
Whereas the philosophies of Enlightenment finally completely overcame the Middle 
Ages in the Christian Western world, Koran scholars guided by tradition suffocated all 
the impulses of enlightenment in the Islamic orient and led the majority of their believers 
back into the middle Ages. In this way, were formed the differences between the Western 
and the Islamic world which nowadays determine the relationship between the orient and 
the occident.66 
This reversal was to have far-reaching consequences. As the West was now able 
to develop its sciences freely, it encountered a dynamic, the threshold of which the 
Islamic civilization had already reached once. But the Europeans were aiming to exceed 
                                                 
65  See Esposito, The Islamic Threat, p. 40-41. 
66  See Akhavi, Islam and the West in World History, p. 552: “The theoretical and actual separation of 
church and state in the West […] greatly influenced the West’s ascendancy. Without the triumph of 
Cartesian radical rationalism, the disembedding of church and state and the scientific and industrial 
revolutions could probably not have occurred.” 
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this, because the churches no longer had the power to patronize, creating a pluralistic 
industrial civilization. This was a secular society, in which the political-social sphere was 
strictly separated from the religious – a society in which enlightenment asserted itself and 
social cohabitation was organized beyond religious dogmas. Around 1750, the world's 
first secular industrial society originated, and, by the middle of the 19th century, many of 
the main Western European countries had been fundamentally changed by an industrial 
revolution.67 Parallel to this, early capitalist economic systems and modern democracies 
developed in England, the USA and France as early as the end of the 18th century. This 
epochal change gave the industrial nations in the West the military and economic impetus 
to extend their influence and their model of a civilization to other, even faraway peoples. 
As a consequence, the Ottoman Empire was to suffer the same fate as the Chinese 
empire, which had been unshakable for centuries. The Islamic world felt the full force of 
the rapid growth in the power of the West as early as the 18th century. In the late 19th 
century, the Ottoman Empire had lost the majority of its power and had become “the sick 
man of Europe”. The Western colonial powers replaced the Ottomans as the ordering 
factor in the region and started to subject the Islamic world to their power and divide it up 
amongst them. The clearly defined order of Islam, the Moslem identity, was washed 
away by the circulation of the Western modernity from the West. As a consequence of 
colonization, the Islamic world was disconnected from the course of modern history, 
from industrialization and technical/scientific progress. Whilst the memory of the 
glorious times, the pride of conquests and achievements of the past remained alive, the 
power of the Moslem world to assert itself in reality died. Back in 1957, Wilfred C. 
Smith precisely regarded this discrepancy between claim and reality in the Muslim world 
as the actual „spiritual crisis in Islam“ which “stems from an awareness that something is 
awry between the religion which God has appointed and the historical development of the 
world which He controls.“68 
Similar to China, they were less and less successful in putting the claim of being a 
superior civilization and the spearhead of human development into harmony with the 
experience of a reality in which the technical-civilization superiority of the West became 
                                                 
67  See Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Confronts the Secular State, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles 1993, p. 26-30. 
68  Wilfred C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, Princeton, New York 1957, p. 41. 
24 
more and more obvious. By the 19th century, John Esposito points out, “a clear shift of 
power had occurred, as the decline of Muslim fortunes reversed the relationship of Islam 
to the West. Increasingly, Muslims found themselves on the defensive in the face of 
European expansion.”69 
As in China, a time of insults and humiliations began. After a phase of economic 
expansion, European colonial powers, above all France and Great Britain, effortlessly 
penetrated into Moslem territory in the early 19th century and settled there. The conquest 
of Algeria in 1830 by the French was followed by the occupancy of Aden by the British 
in 1839. Colonization of the Moslem world continued with the British occupation of 
Egypt (1882), the expansion of French control to Tunisia (1881) and Morocco (1911), as 
well as the expansion of the British influence on the Persian Gulf. Like the Boxers in 
China, the Moslems also suffered the humiliating experience that the West was willing 
and in a position to declare zones of influence or to subject territories to its rule 
completely, almost as it liked. The British spoke of the “white man’s burden“ and the 
French of their “mission to civilize.“ As the balance of power and leadership shifted from 
the Muslim world to Europe, modernity was seen by the West as the result not simply of 
conditions that produced the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution, but also of 
Christianity’ inherent superiority as a religion and culture. 
One Ottoman province after the other was lost to the heathens. The indigenous 
population and their governments had nothing to counter the imperialism of the colonial 
powers and the challenge of the modern Western world. Their own defenselessness 
against the Western expansion, caused by backwardness and a lack of willingness to 
reform, dug its way deep into the Moslems' collective memory as a trauma: 
 
The realities of colonialism and imperialism, forgotten or conveniently 
overlooked by many in the West, are part of the living legacy, firmly 
implanted in the memory (however exaggerated at times) of many in the 
Muslim world.70 
 
The theme of European colonialism and imperialism, their impact in the past and 
their continued legacy, remains alive in Arabic and Middle East politics and throughout 
                                                 
69  Esposito, The Islamic Threat, p. 48. 
70  Ibid, p. 217. 
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the Muslim world from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Issues of foreign domination and 
dependence remain a bitter memory as well as a continued threat in the eyes of many 
Muslims today.71 
Under these circumstances, it stands to reason that the actual and imagined 
humiliations which the Moslem world accused the West of are still combined in the 
accusation of “imperialism.” As Bernard Lewis states, however, the term has a different 
meaning in the literature of the Islamists than in the West. Whereas, in the West, it 
essentially describes the past politics of the European colonial powers and Western 
superpowers from the 18th to the 20th centuries and thus above all has power politics as its 
content, Islamists regularly use it in connection with a cultural expansion of the West. 
This imperialism is not to be confused with that of the West against China in the previous 
century. Since the conquest and division of the Islamic world by European powers has 
become a thing of the past, the West is instead being accused of an imperialism of 
civilization and religion. This is all the more despicable for Moslems as Islam is regarded 
as the superior, true religion: 
 
Of all these offenses the one that is most widely, frequently, and 
vehemently denounced is undoubtedly imperialism – sometimes just 
Western, sometimes Eastern (that is, Soviet) and Western alike. But the 
way this term is used in the literature of Islamic fundamentalists often 
suggests that it may not carry quite the same meaning for them as for its 
Western critics. In many of theses writings the term “imperialist” is given 
a distinctly religious significance, being used in association, and 
sometimes interchangeably, with ‘missionary’, and demoting a form of 
attack that includes the Crusades as well as the modern colonial empires. 
One also sometimes gets the impression that the offense of imperialism is 
not – as for Western critics – the domination by one people over another 
but rather the allocation of roles in this relationship. What is truly evil and 
unacceptable is the domination of infidels over true believers.  For true 
believers to rule misbelievers is proper and natural, since this provides for 
the maintenance of the holy law, and gives the misbelievers both the 
opportunity and the incentive to embrace the true faith. But for 
misbelievers to rule over true believers is blasphemous and unnatural, 
since it leads to the corruption of religion and morality in society, and to 
the flouting or even the abrogation of God’s law.72                                                  
71  See Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West, p. 12: “Muslim memories of Western domination are 
more recent and hence far more fresh than Western recollections of the fall of Gallipoli or the siege of 
Vienna.” 
72  Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, p. 53-54. 
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So a penetration of the civilization was connected with the economic and 
subsequent, partial military conquest of the Moslem world by the Western world. 
Impressed by the apparent military, technical and economic superiority of European 
industrial states, members of the Ottoman cultural class began increasingly to perceive 
their own civilization as being backward. The reforms held in the subsequent period were 
more or less half-hearted and were basically only intended to strengthen the fighting 
power of the military without initiating a really radically change of state and society, as 
has been the case in China. But even these few reform efforts of the Sultanate, initiated 
hesitantly and hardly having any effects, were enough to threaten the privileges of the 
elites and shattered traditional social patterns. Against this background, it appears 
doubtful whether this confrontation between the Western and the Moslem world alone 
can be deflated by a strengthening of the Moslem states and a balancing of the realities of 
power politics connected with it. Shahrough Akhavi, however, exactly suggests this in his 
article Islam and the West in World History: 
 
In other word, today’s criticism of the West in the Muslim World, 
frequently accompanied by a rejection of Western secular culture, seems 
to be positively correlated with the Muslim’s sense of weakness and 
vulnerability in the face of powerful Western states and economic 
domination. This suggests that if the relationship between the Muslim and 
Western worlds were to become more equal in the future, Muslim 
rejectionism could be expected to be transformed into more tolerant 
attitudes and behavior.73 
 
Until the present, the gap between the past historical greatness, the feeling of a 
superiority of the civilization and the present reality of life has not been overcome, either 
in China or in the Moslem world.74 The disproportion between their own widely based 
poverty, the lack of prospects for the youth and the mainly bad government and the high 
standard of living of the West and the comparatively great efficiency of its governmental 
                                                 
73  Akhavi, Islam and the West, p. 559. 
74  See Esposito, The Islamic Threat, p. 49: “European colonialism and imperialism threatened Muslim 
political and religiocultural identity and history. […] With the dawn of European domination of the 
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systems is nowadays registered in the Moslem world.75 The impact of the self-image 
exaggerated by the Arabic heyday and the religious identity with the hopelessness of 
everyday life generated massive inferiority complexes, which easily lead to hatred and 
violence. A formerly great civilization, conscious of its own superiority, which had 
provided important impulses for the development of Europe, experiences its weaknesses 
and impending dissolution. Colonial inheritance, the failed attempt at a modernization 
aligned to Western ideas, the enormous growth of the population and the rejuvenation 
connected with this, growing poverty with simultaneously growing alphabetization and 
urbanization as well as, above all, the feeling of a lack of dignity of a formerly great 
culture in the face of a gap in engineering and prosperity between the Western and the 
Islamic world which is growing even further – all of this forms the historical background 
and the breeding ground for totalitarian Islamism. 
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III. THE BOXER UPRISING AS AN EARLY EXAMPLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND 
MULTINATIONAL INTERVENTION 
In far-away Europe and America, the incidents in north China, which kept the 
governments and the public on tenterhooks in the summer of 1900, are known under the 
title of the “Boxer Uprising”. The name “Boxer” was derived from its original name 
“Fists of Righteous Harmony” and the martial arts of which its members had a more or 
less good mastery and was described as “boxing” by many Western foreigners.76 
However, the term “uprising” itself is misleading, as the Boxers did not stand up against 
the rule of the Manchus and their Ch’ing dynasty. The movement proved to be loyal to 
the regime and was rather aimed in general against everything “foreign.”77 This included 
both the foreign religion, i.e. Christianity and its Chinese converts, as well as the 
damaging influence of the Western colonial powers on Chinese politics and society as 
well as the foreigners in China themselves.78  
As Joseph Esherick states, the international powers and their Chinese negotiation 
partners agreed on interpreting the events as a rebellion against the Manchu rule after the 
Boxers had been crushed, as this was the only way to justify a continuation of the Ch’ing 
dynasty.79 However, a functioning Chinese government appeared to be indispensable for 
the major powers as a negotiating partner, debtor and general stability factor in the giant 
empire. Nevertheless, the term “Boxer Uprising” does contain a historically correct core. 
Even if the uprising was not aimed against their own government, it was aimed against 
the Western colonial powers and Japan, who had been exploiting China economically 
through unilateral treaties since the 1840's and were increasingly eroding China's political 
self-determination. In addition, the traditional Chinese society, marked by Confucius, had 
                                                 
76  See Diana Preston, The Boxer Rebellion. The Dramatic Story of China’s War on Foreigners That 
Shook the World in the Summer of 1900, New York 2001, p.22. 
77  See Joseph W. Esherick, The Origins of the Boxer Uprising, Berkeley 1987, p. xvi: „…from the very 
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30 
been placed under pressure of cultural transformation by the West, the dimensions of 
which are comparable with the current effects of globalization.  
The “purely political and opportunist origin of the term”80 was not the only myth 
connected with what happened in China of the year of 1900. In addition, there was the 
legend of the heroic, civilized and unified West, that resisted an uncivilized, uninformed 
“Yellow Peril”81 of peasant “Boxers,” corrupt civil servants, and reactionary soldiers who 
paid no regard to international law and were unjustifiably xenophobic, and that 
conquered them and finally taught them a well-deserved lesson by means of its 
ambassadors and a few soldiers. Soon, a further myth was set against this one in China, 
the myth of the intrepid poor Chinese farmers who had fought a just fight against the 
imperialist invaders from the West and their agents, the deceitful missionaries.82 Both of 
these myths developed – as is the nature of myths – independent of historical reality to a 
great extent and developed their own life, blocking the view to the actual historical 
happenings and making a factual assessment difficult for a long time.83 A historical 
correction can only be done peripherally in the course of this paper. In the following 
sections, which outline the origin and the course of the Boxer Uprising, sets the historical 
frame for the later analysis of the events with the questions stated in the introduction. 
 
 
A. ORIGINS OF THE BOXER MOVEMENT 
 
Towards the end of the 19th century, China moved into the focus of interest of the 
European colonial powers. After the “scramble for Africa” had been completed in 1890, 
                                                 
80  See Esherick, The Origins of the Boxer Uprising, p. xiv. 
81  The defeat of China in 1894-95 by Japan’s army and navy, both organized and equipped along 
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the Chinese defeat in the war against Japan (1894/95) appeared to ring in the 
colonialization of China. A territorial division of China according to the African model, 
the “carving up the Chinese melon,”84 was however not practicable, on the one hand 
because of the increasing rivalry of the imperialist major powers amongst one another, 
and on the other hand because none of the European powers had the resources to control 
the enormous empire in the long run.85 For this reason, the major powers only claimed 
zones of interest, in which they demanded specific privileges and which, together with 
minor geographical outposts, were to become the gates for a further penetration into the 
hinterland in question.86 
Alongside the general imperialist basic conviction of the time that only states 
which grew could assert themselves in the contest of the nations, the major powers were 
motivated above all by the hope for the fairy-tale riches of the Ch’ing empire. Great 
Britain and France had opened China for international trade in the two Opium Wars 
(1839-42 and 1858-61) and had asserted the right to station warships in Chinese waters 
on a permanent basis.87  At the end of the century, all the major powers had warships in 
East Asia, in order to be able to defend or assert their claims and interests against the 
Chinese imperial court and their colonial competitors robustly. These marine units were 
given a special role in the suppression of the Boxer uprising. 
The economic exploitation of China by the major powers and the penetration of 
Chinese society with Western values and ideas connected with this was possibly the most 
important reason, but not responsible on its own for the origination of the Boxer uprising. 
Instead, the Boxer movement fed on a series of quite differing political, social and 
regional sources, which only came together relatively late, but then all the more 
ferociously, in the Boxer movement.88 These various sources required certain economic, 
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ecological, political and social conditions, all of which the north Chinese province of 
Shantung offered at the end of the 19th century, in order to come together. In detail, these 
conditions included the following: 
- The ecological instability and susceptibility to catastrophes of this region, 
manifested by a large number of floods and drought catastrophes, which had 
become even worse since the shift in course of the Yellow River, which had been 
flowing through West Shantung since 1855. The population lived in the permanent 
fear of the destruction of their harvests and the starvation that would result from 
this;89 
- The general poverty, increased by the gradual silting of the Great Canal – the 
main transport route in China – and by the loss of sales markets for domestic 
products, above all cotton thread, as a result of the penetration of Western products 
to North China;90 
- The inability of the Ch’ing dynasty to assert itself and control local regions, 
particularly making the extreme south-west of Shantung an area in which attacks by 
robbers were the order of the day and which became an ideal field of operation for 
salt smugglers, bandits and other outsiders of society; 
- The activities of Christian missionaries, which had increased since the 1880's, 
aggressively winning over Chinese converts with questionable methods and 
frequently intervening in local legal disputes for the benefit of the converted 
Christians. This threatened the structure and the functionality of the traditional 
village community and led to grudges, which easily turned into violent conflicts.91 
 
Against this background, the “Long Knives” (Dadaohui) appeared in the 
southwest of the province in 1896, a group with the original purpose of providing the 
major landowners with protection against attacks by bandits. Their members practiced 
traditional martial techniques. By reciting magic formulas and drinking the ash of sheets 
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of paper with burnt magic formulas dissolved in water, they hoped to attain 
invincibility.92  
As a result of a dispute with a landowner who was under the protection of the 
Catholic Church, they attacked Western mission schools, but they were relatively quickly 
put back in their place by the local authorities. “Boxing schools” also shot up all over the 
north of the province of Shantung, in which particularly the young rural population 
practiced corresponding martial techniques under the leadership of experienced “boxing 
masters.” When the conflicts between the Christian and non-Christian parts of the 
population took on increasingly serious forms in the north-west of the province in 1898, 
the Boxers, who now called themselves Yihequan (“boxers united in righteousness”) 
intervened on the side of the non-Christians and began to proceed against Chinese 
Christians, Christian schools and churches.93 In this context, the first posters and flags 
with the appeal “Support the Ch’ing Dynasty and destroy foreign things” (fu Ch’ing mie 
Yang) appeared, presumably with the objective of averting intervention by the provincial 
authorities.94 
More and more Boxer groups now appeared under a slightly changed name. They now 
called themselves “militias united in righteousness” (Yihetuan). By equating themselves 
by name with the “militias” (tuan) set up everywhere since the middle of the century to 
reinstate and to maintain order, they emphasized the pro-dynastic elements of the 
movement. In the course of the year of 1899, the movement propagated quickly and 
spread to the neighboring province of Zhili. It was the popular “ideology” of the Boxers – 
hatred of everything foreign, the easy-to-learn Boxer rituals and the “invulnerability” - 
that enabled the movement to leave its main area and to spread into other areas. By the 
end of the year of 1899, the Boxers intervened not so much against foreigners, but against 
Chinese Christians. According to incomplete statistics, more than 32,000 Chinese 
Christians and about 200 foreigners died in the unrest, the victims of the actual military 
disputes and the losses on the Boxers' side not being counted in this.95 
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B. THE “WHITE DANGER” 
 
The colonial development of China by the West formed the background for the 
Boxer Uprising and explains why the fighting organization was able to get a decidedly 
xenophobic touch: 
 
An enumeration of immediate determining causes of the Boxer rebellion is 
more to be found in diplomatic archives than in a study of any other 
sources. Leases, commercial servitudes, the loss of sovereignty over the 
finest harbors, the hypothecation of likin and salt revenues, the contracts to 
promoters and concessions to missionaries forced at the cannon’s mouth, 
the talk of partition, the diplomatic wrangles over ‘spheres of influence’ 
and ‘balance of power’, the exaction of the last possible farthing as 
indemnity for acts for which neither Europe nor the United States would 
have granted indemnity or apology – the answer of the Chinese to all these 
humiliations was the outbreak of 1900. In fact, […] the Boxer Rebellion 
was a foregone conclusion, and apology and blame for succeeding events 
should primarily be laid at Europe’s door, not at China’s.96  
 
However, like the case of the current Islamic terror, the foreign influence of the 
West on all the areas of life, which was sensed as a threat, formed an ideal resonance 
surface for social tensions and political dissatisfaction that already existed quite 
independently. Shandong, for example, was not even a province penetrated particularly 
strongly by symbols of the Western influence, but the consequences of this “clash of 
civilizations”, which were partly quite dramatic for the indigenous population, can also 
be seen here.97 For example, the province lost its markets for cotton thread to the 
Europeans without there even being alternatives for the people there. Strange telegraph 
lines and railways passed through the country, and the foreigners ran mines in the area. 
Like the twin towers at 9/11, symbols of Western civilization became the first and 
primarily goals:  
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Disturbances are to be dreaded from the foreign devils; everywhere they 
are starting missions, erecting telegraphs, and building railways; they do 
not believe in the sacred doctrine, and they speak evil of the gods. Their 
sins are numberless as the hairs of the head. […] The will of heaven is that 
the telegraph wires be first cut, then the railways torn up, and then shall 
the foreign devils be decapitated.98 
 
To start with, the population did not object much to these symbols of Western 
civilization and way of life. But the humiliation in the war against Japan in 1894/95 
clearly showed them their government's weaknesses.99 
Whereas it is mainly the Western entertainment and pop culture that typifies the 
ideas of people from the West in the modern Islamic countries, the population in 
Shandong mainly came into contact with the West through the missionaries, whose 
activity was to prove to be just as aggressive and culturally threatening for the Confucian 
society as the current effect of McDonalds and MTV on Islamic societies. For the 
Chinese, the missionaries represented “the foreign” per se and thus became a suitable 
target for their hatred. The Western missionaries were regarded as the “advance-agent of 
his particular Government, sent to China not for religion’s sake but in a political capacity 
thus disguised.”100 In particular, the Catholic missionaries provoked the population 
through their aggressive mission and their arrogant conduct and they practically tempted 
resistance. In their procedures, the missionaries – with certain exceptions – only showed 
a slight feeling for the religious/cultural and political/social structures in China. Even the 
Indians, Japanese and especially the Chinese, who were classified as being culturally 
higher – for example compared with Red Indians and Africans – were merely poor and 
confused “idol worshippers,” whose “idols' temples” were to be destroyed, in the eyes of 
Western missionaries, as far as their religious ideas were concerned.101 
The missionaries were not subject to Chinese law – a privilege blackmailed from 
China in treaties with the West. This basis of power was made use of by the clergy in the 
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regional conflicts for power and land. Further, they seriously interfered with the village 
structures: converted Chinese were legally placed under their personal protection. In this 
way, the Christian religion became particularly interesting for the people who were poor 
or persecuted by the Chinese government (e.g. bandits or members of sects). This fact 
caused the acknowledgement of the mission with the remainder of the population to drop 
further. The mission appeared to be a maid and an ally of the imperialistic powers, “anti-
imperialistic” and “anti-Christian” became synonymous terms for the Chinese.102 
But particular hatred was felt for the converted Chinese, as their new religion 
placed them outside the traditional social structure of the villages and thus threatened its 
survival as a cult or ancestral community and economic unit. Converts were not able to 
inherit and were excluded from participating in ceremonies of the Taoist cult and 
festivals in their villages. Therefore they also did not contribute to the costs, which now 
had to be distributed amongst fewer people.103 As Diana Preston states, the socially 
ostracized converts, in order to survive, became totally dependent upon the missionaries 
and worked as servants or porters: “Many were from the poorest groups anyway and were 
disparagingly called ‘rice Christians’ in the belief that they had converted only to fill their 
stomachs.”104 
So it was above all the Christian beliefs that threatened traditional social 
structures and hierarchies and caused resistance as a consequence of the military and 
economic expansion of the West. Today, Christianity appears to have lost most of its 
missionary power. The promise of healing as the tip of the Western way of life has been 
replaced by the democratically formed, laziest social system, frequently sensed by social, 
political and religious elites in Islamic states as being a challenge and a danger. 
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C. RELIGIOUS ORIGINS 
 
Although there were common points between the “Boxers united in 
righteousness” and the “Long Knives” - in particular the belief in the necessary practices 
to attain invulnerability - there was a decisive difference in the fact that the northern 
Boxers additionally carried out a kind of invocation to the gods. The individual Boxers 
appealed to deities known from popular operas and the religion of the people, also going 
into a trance or a state of obsession. They were of the opinion that the deities – above all 
the God of War – thus became attached to their bodies and would ensure a quick mastery 
of the necessary fighting techniques and their invulnerability in this way.105 
In China, where it had been widely believed for centuries that there was a link 
between human behavior and the actions of Heaven, correction of human misconduct in 
order to establish cosmic harmony has been one means of responding to drought.  
Droughts had, more than other natural disasters, a religious and social dimension. To the 
most important collective tasks of the local communities belonged religious ceremonies 
with the purpose to make rain. The Boxers believed that only the physical elimination of 
every trace of the foreign from China would appease the gods and permit the rains once 
again to fall.106 
The arrogance of the West of standing for a higher civilization or a morally better 
way of living found its eloquent expression in the building of churches with pointed 
towers, through which the traditional harmony between man and nature was disturbed 
from a Chinese point of view. The Boxers assumed that their gods were angered by this 
and explained the permanent natural catastrophes in this way. “Annoyance by a church 
tower”, said an English observer, “was just as much a reason for a loud complaint as 
building an evil-smelling tannery next to Westminster Abbey would have been.”107 The 
British embassy took the problem so seriously that it saw itself forced to write a circular 
to the missions recommending that they “show more respect for the prejudices of the 
Chinese and their superstitions in the shapes and the height of the buildings”.108 
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Alongside churches and other Christian symbols, technical innovations from the 
West also caused religious reservations with the Chinese. Above all, railways caused 
mistrust and resistance. Hardly a mile of tracks could be laid without the burial place of 
some predecessor of a Chinese, arbitrarily placed in the countryside, being desecrated. 
The telegraph lines also caused fear and desperation. Their purpose was unfathomable 
and their sight terrifying for the simple country people, whose tapestry of fields the big 
pillars crossed. When the wind blew, a quiet, pitiful plaint came out of the wires, and 
when they went rusty, the rain falling down from them was dyed red and reinforced the 
belief that the spirits were being tormented by this new invention of the “foreign 
devils.”109 
Even if they referred to the sensitivity of the spirits more with a wish to resist the 
unwelcome foreigners than from a deep belief, it must be stated that religious 
reservations had equal force with the rejection of the social, economic and cultural 
changes which the West caused. A similar flowing together of religious demarcation with 
social and political reservations against the Western influence also characterizes the 
ideological breeding ground on which the current Islamic terror feeds. The religiously 
motivated hatred manifesting itself nowadays in Islamic terror also exceeds animosity 
against certain interests, actions, and political measures of individual states in the West 
and translates into a total rejection of the Western civilization. It is not so much important 
what it does or what it is. The actual rejection applies to the principles and values which 
this civilization practices and to which it confesses. These principles and values are 
deemed bad per se and those who stand up for them or accept them are regarded as 
“enemies of God.” It is no pure chance that Boxers and Islamic fundamentalists use 
similar metaphors: the “foreign devils” are equated by the Western devils and the “great 
Satan” America. 
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D. PUBLIC SUPPORT AND SOCIAL COMPOSITION 
 
The enormous growth of the Boxer movement can only be explained by great 
support in the population.110 The penetration of the West had paralyzed complete local 
branches of industry, such as small peasants' cotton production or the transport trade, and 
drastically increased unemployment. In addition, natural catastrophes, such as the 
flooding of the Huanghe (1898/99) and a long drought (1900), hit North China and 
further exacerbated the economically tense circumstances of the rural population. The 
“foreign devils” and their Chinese henchmen, the converts, were made responsible for 
everything - including the weather - as scapegoats. Dispersion of the “foreign devils,” the 
Boxers promised, would not only appease the gods, but also mean a renovation of 
Chinese society and the advent of a new golden age for China. On leaflets and public 
notices, by means of which the Boxer messages were propagated, it said:  
 
„Divinely aided Boxers, 
United-in-Righteous Corps 
Arose because the Devils 
Messed up the Empire of yore. 
 
They proselytize their sect, 
And believe in only one God, 
The spirits and their own ancestors 
Are not even given a nod. 
 
The men are all immoral; 
Their women truly vile. 
For the Devils it’s mother-son sex 
That serves as the breeding style. 
 
And if you don’t believe me, 
Then have a careful view: 
You’ll see the Devils’ eyes 
Are all a shining blue. 
 
No rain comes from Heaven. 
The earth is parched and dry. 
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And all because the churches 
Have bottled up the sky. 
 
The gods are very angry.  
The spirits seek revenge. 
En masse they come from Heaven 
To teach the Way to men. […] 
 
Spirits emerge from the grottos; 
Gods come down from the hills, 
Possessing the bodies of men, 
Transmitting their boxing skills. 
 
When their martial and magic techniques 
Are all learned by each one of you, 
Suppressing the Foreign Devils 
Will not be a tough thing to do.”111 
 
The ideas of the Boxer movement spread by word of mouth and at an unusual 
speed – a Chinese chronicler compared it with a tornado - although the Boxers had no 
leader and no organizational structure.112 Such a group of gods in human form needed no 
leader and also would not have accepted a leader. This made suppression of the Boxer 
movement by the authorities more difficult. The policy successfully used in the past by 
which the leaders of uprisings were executed, but the large mass of the uprisers was 
spared and requested to spread out, no longer worked.113  
To sum up, we can say that the Boxers, parallel to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 
enjoyed wide support in the population - at least for their prime concern -, expulsion of 
the foreigners and suppression of the Western influence and way of life. In addition, their 
political objective - the renovation of Chinese society - remained just as vague as al-
Qaeda's promise to unite all Moslems in a new caliphate.114 
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E. GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT 
 
The Chinese leadership was split in its assessment of the Boxer movement. 
Traditionalist groups in the civil service saw the Boxers as a source of dissatisfaction 
which could be made use of politically and militarily against the foreign rule. The 
integration of the Boxer associations into local militias and, in June 1900, into the army 
aimed at this use of their services for official politics and the integrity of China. Civil 
servants open to Western innovations saw the Boxers as undisciplined rebels who had to 
be combated. Useless for any military dispute with Western troops, due to their weapons 
and their rituals alone,115 the Boxers also appeared to jeopardize the inner, traditional 
order in China and to provoke the foreigners even further. Thus, military disputes 
between Boxers and government troops occurred in early 1900, although a number of 
high civil servants toyed with the idea of instrumentalizing the mass movement of the 
Boxers and of expelling the unpopular foreigners from the capital and the entire 
country.116 
The Imperial Court, above all the widow and regent Cixi (1863-1908), was caught 
between the two camps and tended towards one, then the other side, depending on the 
dominance of a grouping at Court. The Guangxu Emperor, a nephew of the Emperor's 
widow, had been under house arrest since the failed Reforms of the Hundred Days 
(1898).117 Blockage of these reforms increased the power of the conservatives at court 
and led to a massive setback for any kind of modernization in the country. In the situation 
of stagnation and unwillingness for reforms, it was only consistent to grant the Boxer 
Movement leeway than to protect the “foreign devils” in the event of a conflict.118 In 
fact, only few imperial civil servants subsequently took military measures to suppress the 
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movement. Some actions by high civil servants could even be assessed as tacit support by 
the Boxers.  
 
 
F. THE BEGINNING OF THE UPRISING 
 
During the spring and the early summer of the year of 1900, the uprising quickly 
spread in the direction of the two major cities of Peking and Tientsin. Amongst other 
things, a long drought, which plagued North China, contributed to this. Powerlessly, the 
peasant population saw the prospect of a catastrophic starvation emerge. The general 
desperation and hopelessness looked for an outlet. 
For the foreigners, the situation became so threatening in January 1900 that a 
number of ambassadors demanded the suppression of the Boxer Movement. When they 
heard news of attacks by Boxers on the railway lines between Tientsin and the capital, the 
embassies in Peking decided to request their own soldiers for their protection on May 
28.119 Even if all the powers except Japan sent more soldiers than the Chinese 
government had officially admitted, the international military force of more than 400 
officers and soldiers which arrived in Peking on May 31 appeared still seriously small to 
the diplomats in the embassy quarter.120 Their worries were not without reason: more and 
more news about further attacks by Boxers on missionaries and Chinese Christians 
occurred. After an attack on Belgian engineers near Paoting, to the east of Peking, and the 
murder of two missionaries by Boxers, it was the burning of the stands at the foreign 
race-course outside the gates of the Chinese capital - which was comparatively harmless 
in the heated situation - that caused the ambassadors to demand further troops.121 
Against this background, a clear policy of the government towards the Boxers 
would have been necessary. Decisive intervention with the help of well-trained regular 
Chinese troops could have put the Boxers under control again. But at the court, there was 
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no agreement on the mode of procedure to start with.122 Ironically, it appears to have 
been the request for reinforcement of the embassy guards by the foreign ambassadors that 
on the one hand ensured the defeat of the more prudent forces in the Chinese leadership 
and on the other enticed the Boxers to more decisive actions against foreigners.123 
 
 
G. THE GREAT POWERS’ RESPONSE AND MILITARY INTERVENTION 
 
The 17 international warships that gathered off Taku in the meantime thereupon 
put an expedition under the command of the British admiral Seymour as the senior 
officer. The expedition named after him, with more than 2,000 men, started for Peking on 
June 10. Even though the Boxers had repeatedly attacked the railways and destroyed the 
tracks again and again, Seymour expected to be able to reach Peking speedily. This 
optimism was based not least on a disdain for the military potential of the Chinese; it was 
assumed that a well-armed European force could beat any Chinese unit. This false 
estimation almost led to catastrophe. Only shortly after their departure, skirmishes with 
individual Boxer troops accumulated. At Langfang, about 60 km from Peking, the train 
was stopped on June 11. In the following days, there were repeated attacks. Nevertheless, 
Seymour was optimistic to start with that he could reach Peking in the next few days. The 
situation of the expedition became threatening on June 15, when he was given the news 
that retreat by train had been cut off. Seymour now gave the command to retreat to the 
next station in Lofa. In the middle of the preparations for the retreat, another attack came, 
this time with the participation of Chinese infantry and cavalry. With the deployment of 
regular Chinese troops, a further advance had finally become an incalculable risk.124 
This new phase of the Boxer Uprising had to do with both incidents in Peking and 
also off Taku. The situation in the capital was aggravated even further. On June 11, the 
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Japanese legation Counselor Sugiyama was cut to pieces by Chinese soldiers on the way 
to the station amid the applause of the surrounding spectators. The situation was heated 
even further when the German Ambassador Clemens von Ketteler locked two Boxers 
away in the embassy for questioning of his own accord.125 Within a very short time, the 
wildest rumors started doing the rounds amongst the Chinese population in Peking, and 
the mood, which was tense to start with, became more and more aggressive. Aboard the 
warships off Taku, officers could only assume what was happening in the Chinese 
capital. With a view to the unclear situation, the senior officers of the international fleet 
decided that they had to get the Chinese coastal forts under their control at all costs – 
otherwise, they could contemplate neither supporting the Seymour expedition nor 
reproducing the connection to Peking. 
The chiefs of the squadron gave the commanders of the Taku forts an ultimatum 
and simultaneously began preparing to attack the forts. A formal rejection of the 
ultimatum was not even possible, as fire was opened on the forts before it had expired. At 
1.30 a.m. on June 17, 1900, the attack of the international gunboat fleet commenced. The 
battle lasted for a total of almost six hours, the last Chinese batteries only stopping firing 
at about 7 in the morning.126 
With the battle for the Taku forts, the international marine group had secured 
access to the country, but this success meant little due to the difficult situation of the 
Seymour expedition, which was still at Langfang and moved on from there on June 19. 
Only shortly after their departure, a new attack took place. On June 20, the front of the 
train was shot. The expedition was able to hide in a Chinese arsenal after that, but the 
regular Chinese troops with whom they were now fighting were distinctly more serious 
opponents than the Western disdain had admitted. The help they needed only arrived on 
June 25. The day after, the expedition was able to march off at last. With the return of the 
battered Seymour expedition, the enterprise found a happy end, although all of the 
connections to Peking remained interrupted. 
At this time, the imperial Chinese court had already started supporting the Boxers 
openly. On June 17, the Chinese government demanded that all foreigners leave Peking. 
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A decision was difficult for the ambassadors, as they were of the opinion that remaining 
in the capital would probably mean “carnage, going away a sure demise.” As no answer 
was received to various correspondences until shortly before the end of the ultimatum, 
the German Ambassador von Ketteler made his way to the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 
June 20. On the way there, he was shot in his sedan chair.127 Foreigners, missionaries and 
numerous Chinese Christians fled in swarms to the embassy quarter, where the embassy 
guards began the stopgap strengthening of the area. The first attacks came shortly after 
the end of the ultimatum. The following siege was to last for 55 days. 
By this time, the foreign powers put a relief force together, for which contingents 
from Japan, Russia and also from the British, American and French colonies were 
deployed. The actual advance on Peking was postponed repeatedly, as the military 
situation remained unclear and as estimates of the size the relief troop requited reached 
record figures again and again. The actual advance did not begin until August. After a 
race to get to Peking, which met little serious resistance, the embassies were relieved by 
the 20,000 troops in the international force, composed of 3,000 British, 2,000 Americans, 
5,000 Russians, 10,000 Japanese, 800 French, Italians, Austrians and Germans, on 
August 14, 1900.128 
Due to a lack of precise information, wild rumors circulated in Europe. In early 
July, the report that the embassies had been burnt down and all foreigners killed arrived. 
Further, it was reported that Boxer uprisings had broken out all over China and the 
movement was spreading towards the south. Although there were not actually any 
incidents south of Shantung, Western circles in Shanghai, Amoy, Hankou and even in 
Canton fantasized about the danger from the Boxers. As these fears were also shared by 
diplomatic representatives and could not be verified from Europe, the marine presence 
was reinforced in the whole of China.  
In December 1900, the negotiations over a peace agreement with China began. 
After a series of high civil servants, made out to be the “main culprits” of the Boxer 
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Uprising, had been executed, banished or degraded at the beginning of the new year, a 
treaty imposing high reparations on China and assuring military access to the embassies 
in Peking was signed in September 1901 under pressure by the Allies. For the German 
side, there was the demand in the text that a member of the Imperial Family was sent to 
Germany on a “penance mission” and that a monument was built at the spot where von 
Ketteler was murdered. These peace terms were unusually severe, and the last two were 
intended precisely to humiliate the loser.129 
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IV. ISLAMISTIC TERROR AS THE NEW THREAT TO THE 
WEST 
A. ORIGINS OF THE ISLAMIC TERROR 
 
Western opinion on the causes of the Islamist’s anti-Westernism is divided. Some 
scholars see the roots of the Islamist’s anti-Westernism in addition to a fundamental 
civilizational incompatibility in the feelings of humiliation, fear, and envy that the 
Muslims harbor toward the West. There are elements of truth in these views as will be 
shown in the following sections. The humiliations factor, in particular, as a consequence 
of military defeats, colonization, and economic exploitation is certainly a major 
contributor to the anti-Western dimension of the Islamist’s views. The envy factor and 
the attractiveness of Western culture are also important; in fact, many in the Muslim 
world who have turned against the West have done so because they cannot have access to 
it and to the benefits that flow from it.  
Yet, it seems that the impact of the so-called seductive lure of the West has been 
somewhat overplayed. Like the Chinese Boxers in 1900, many Muslims today do not 
favor in particular the dissolution of their indigenous culture and its replacement by a 
poor imitation of Western popular culture. In fact, the West’s attractiveness as a moral 
and spiritual model for the Muslims is declining.130 Therefore it is necessary to take into 
consideration that the Islamist’s anti-Western sentiments arise also from different and 
more complex sources as humiliation and pure envy. Some of these sources are congruent 
with the sources that fuelled the Boxer uprising. There are the legacy of colonialism, 
Western domination of the international economic and political systems that discriminate 
against the weaker states, Western support for unrepresentative and repressive 
governments in Muslim countries that are subservient to the West, and the selective and 
discriminatory application of international rules and principles. According to Shireen 
Hunter “the principal, although not the only, cause of the Islamists’s anti-Westernism is 
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their resentment of Western domination and a feeling – right or wrong – of having been 
unfairly treated; hence, the Islamists desire to change the balance of power.”131 
Islam is not identical with Islamism and Islamism does not necessarily stand for 
violence, let alone terror.132 But in the course of this paper, it is above all the version of 
Islamism which propagates the armed fight against the heathens and the West which is of 
interest. What Taliban, al-Qaeda and other radical-Islamistic organizations have in 
common is the conviction that only an armed fight can help their holy cause to its 
breakthrough with a view to a superior enemy (the ruling, “godless” regime, “the Jews”, 
“the West” or an unholy alliance of these three), because the opponent will thwart any 
peaceful efforts. The jihad is legitimate, unavoidable and per definition defensive for this 
radical minority amongst the Moslems. The Moslems are, to a certain extent, in a state of 
siege, they not only have the right, but also the duty, to defend themselves by 
weapons.133 Although it is incorrect to portray jihad exclusively in terms of armed 
conflict, the Islamists, through the vehicle of jihad, “does not seek negotiations, give-and-
take, the securing of specific concessions, or even the mere seizure of political power 
within a certain number of countries.”134 By the dictates of scripture, jihad cannot 
compromise, nor can it ever negotiate with its enemies. 
Looking at the origins of Islam, it would appear that there exists complete 
scriptural justification for the militant Islamists’s belief in a just struggle against the West 
and the unbelievers. The Prophet Mohammed understood that the tribes of the Arabian 
Peninsula could not be won over easily by the visions of a stranger from Mecca. So 
Mohammad implemented a strategy that enabled Islam to epode upon the world stage – 
he wed his religious teachings to the aggressive predisposition of the desert tribes. 
Warfare of any form was justified if it furthered the mandate of Islam. Unlike 
                                                 
131  Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West, p. 114. 
132  Ibid, pp. 69-115. 
133  See Esposito, The Islamic Threat, p. 31: “The mission of the Islamic community is to spread rule or 
abode of Islam globally much as Muhammad and his followers expanded Islamic rule through 
preaching, diplomacy, and warfare, and to ‘defend’ it. Islamic law stipulates that it is a Muslim’s duty 
to wage war against polytheists, apostates, and People of the Book who refuse Muslim rule, and those 
who attack Muslim territory.” 
134  Ibid. 
49 
Christianity, which developed peacefully among the communication routes of the Roman 
Empire, Islam spread almost exclusively through use of the sword.135 
Another central tenet of Islam related to jihad is the concept of martyrdom. 
According to the Koran, those who die for Allah in this life will receive the highest 
reward in paradise. In one act, a terrorist who loses his life while executing a mission 
against the unbelievers has fulfilled two of Islam’s greatest mandates – jihad and 
martyrdom. 
To a certain degree, it is understandable that Moslems regard their culture and 
political order as threatened by the Western influence, by the Western power politics. 
Although the greatly disdained West has not caused the political demise of Islamic states 
and the collapse of Islamic culture, but made use of and purposefully exacerbated the 
crisis it found in its own favor, Moslem critics therefore accuse the West and in particular 
the leading Western power, the USA, of using their military and economic strength to 
force many peoples in the world to adopt a social system which only brings progress to a 
few people in the upper and middle classes and makes many others poorer than they were 
before. They say that this enforced system deviates considerably from the conditions of a 
Western welfare state and is only intended to keep foreign peoples dependent upon the 
rich West.136   
They claim that the problem is exacerbated by above all the USA partly being 
connected with very corrupt regimes in the Islamic countries and thus preventing urgently 
required social reforms: 
 
The underlying but largely unspoken and unacknowledged cause of the 
dichotomy between Islam and the West is the question of power and the 
consequences of its exercise – that is influence at the regional and global 
levels. This balance of power, which is heavily weighted in the West’s 
flavor, gives the West a tremendous influence over the fate of the Muslim 
states and peoples. The Western countries exercise through a variety of 
financial and military means a good deal of influence on the internal 
politics of Muslim countries, including support for regimes and 
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governments that are less than reasonably supported by the majority of 
their own people.137 
 
In addition, Americans and Europeans sometimes aggressively demonstrate the 
alleged superiority of their culture over all others, which is very humiliating for the 
Moslems. The more powerless the socially deprived and the culturally unnerved feel, the 
greater the sympathy for terror acts in self-defense becomes. They argue that terror is the 
only remaining and thus legitimate weapon of the weak. In their basic statements, such 
arguments match the analyses of self-critical Western scientists who see terrorism of 
suicide bombers as less of a fanatical attitude that the expression of a futility.  
After the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979, fundamentalists, 
Islamists and moderated Moslems formed an alliance against the “unbelieving” enemy. 
They called themselves the “mujaheddin” (warriors of belief). With the help of the USA, 
who wished to stop the progress of the Soviet Union in the central Asian area, the 
mujaheddin were able to force the Soviet troops to move out in 1988 and able to 
overthrow the pro-Soviet satellite regime in Kabul in 1991.138 The Afghan war played a 
significant role in the rise of Islamism. The victory of the Muslim Afghan mujaheddin 
over the Soviet army seemed to point to the importance of Islam as a weapon of 
resistance and victory. If the Arab defeat by Israel in 1967 was the sign of God’s wrath 
toward the Muslim because they have left the path of Islam, then the Soviet defeat must 
have been the sign of God’s renewed mercy because Muslim has rediscovered the 
straight path of Islam.  
With this triumph, the unity of the differing fighting communities collapsed and 
traditional confessional and ethnic differences between Sunnites and Shiites, Pashtunes, 
Usbeks and Tajiks came to light again.139 Although most of the groupings agreed in the 
objective of setting up an “Islamic” state with Iran as the role model, they could not agree 
about the tribe and the confession which were to exercise power in this new state. In this 
situation determined by civil war, a new movement with foreign support and rapidly 
increasing popularity arose: the Taliban.  
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The Arabic word talib (seeker of knowledge) means pupil or student, in the 
figurative sense “Koran scholar”.140 The plural formed in Persian is taliban. Their 
movement was formed from a tribe of the Pashtunes, who make up about 60 per cent of 
the Afghans with their population. Amongst the Islamistic groupings, the Taliban 
represent a particularly radical form of Sunnite orthodoxy. Their intolerance is not only 
aimed at those who believe differently, but above all against Shiites, but also against 
moderated Sunnites.141 The Taliban were not happy with what went on in the country 
during rule by the mujaheddin. They felt that their sacrifices were going to waste as 
power wrangling corruption continued. Thus, the Taliban saw their major mission in 
bringing peace and order and in implementing the true rule of the sharia (Islamic law). 
According to Mullah Omar, one of their key leader, the Taliban 
 
took up arms to achieve the aims of the afghan jihad and save our people 
from further suffering at the hands of the so-called mujaheddin. We had 
complete faith in God almighty. We never forgot that. He can bless us 
with victory or plunge us into defeat.142 
 
In the short period from 1994 to 1996, the Taliban succeeded in getting almost 
four-fifths of Afghanistan under their control and deciding the civil war in their favor to a 
great extent.143  This quick victory was out of the ordinary, as only a few tribal leaders or 
kings had success in governing over the traditionally rivaling groupings of the country for 
a number of centuries.144 In fact, the Taliban rule remained unstable from the outset, 
primarily limiting itself to the towns and villages in terrain which was easy to control, 
and even there, the new rulers were only able to stay in power with intimidation and 
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violence.145 The Taliban's objective was to return Afghanistan to the “original Islam” and 
thus to a pre-industrial, pre-modern form of life. They built their vision of an ideal 
Islamic society upon an Islamic Utopia that they claim existed during the brief period of 
the prophet Muhammad’s rule in Medina and the early Caliphate of Khulfa-I Rashidin 
(632-662), the four “rightly guided” caliphs who succeeded the Prophet Muhammad. The 
Taliban were committed to establishing an exemplary Islamic rule fort he world and 
especially for the Muslim states, and they were impervious to the possibility that their 
Islamic paradigm produced negative stereotypes of Islam. 
The scale was the strictest interpretation of the sharia ever in the Moslem 
world.146 With their resistance, even to any superficial modernization according to a 
Western model, the Taliban regime is an extreme, even amongst Islamistic movements. 
The Taliban closed almost all the schools and the University of the capital Kabul, film 
and television, music and pictures were forbidden. But even playing football, keeping 
pigeons, flying kites and all kinds of toys showing man or animals were forbidden as 
being “unislamic.” All men had to have a beard and women were deprived of all human 
rights. The Taliban totally rejected “the Western-bestowed rights of women.“147 They 
were not allowed to attend a school or do any work and were only allowed to leave their 
houses completely veiled together with their husband or a male relative.148 
For the Taliban, this triumph had only been possible because neighboring 
Pakistan and, initially, the USA had generously provided them with modern weapons and 
money. In this help, both states had been guided by the strategic interest that they would 
finally create an assertive power of order in Afghanistan with the strictly organized 
Taliban and thus also a stable and foreseeable situation. With the support of such a 
regime, they wanted to create the preconditions for obtaining the natural resources in 
Central Asia, above all the greatest amount of natural oil in the world yet to be 
developed. The concrete plan was to lay a pipeline from the oil fields in Kazakhstan 
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through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean.149 Both Pakistan and, to start 
with, the USA accepted the Islamistic, intolerant character of the Taliban and the 
fundamentalist regime of religion and suppression which they set up and can basically 
only be compared with Pol Pot's murdering stone-age communism in Cambodia in the 
1970's.150 It was only when the Taliban granted the al-Qaeda terror organization refuge in 
1996 that the USA and later, as a result of their pressure, Pakistan withdrew their support 
for the Taliban regime. Unlike the global intentions of al-Qaeda, to whom they offered a 
“safe haven”, the Taliban never showed real interest in developments outside their sphere 
of rule.151  
More than 100,000 Moslems from 43 countries of the Islamic world went to the 
military camps in Peshawar in Pakistan and in Afghanistan in the period from 1980 to 
1992. Unnoticed by Western observers to start with, a fundamental change took place 
with them. For the first time in their lives, many radicals from North Africa to Bangla 
Desh had the opportunity to look further than their own regional limitations and to get 
ideas from other Islamistic movements whose operations had been too far away up to 
then. The leaders of various groupings made ideologically and logistic connections 
amongst one another, thus creating the prerequisites for an international network of 
radically Islamic organizations for the first time in the rough, mountainous border area of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.152  Afghanistan served as a ground for military training and 
Islamic indoctrination for large numbers of youth from the Arab and Muslim world, who 
then disseminated what they had learned among their own peoples.  Hence, under Taliban 
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regime, Afghanistan became “a breeding ground for extremists and terrorist groups.”153  
The wake of so-called globalization had now also caught up with Islamism. 
Under these framework conditions, Osama bin Laden was able to found his 
organization al-Qaeda (“The Basis”) in 1989, which was to develop into an umbrella 
organization of groupings with separate operations in the course of the years.154 In 1992, 
bin Laden moved to Sudan, where he turned Al-Qaeda into a tightly organized terror 
organization. In 1996, he had to leave the country again because Saudi Arabia and also 
the USA put the Sudanese government under pressure.155 He returned via Pakistan to 
Afghanistan, where the Taliban had already set up their Islamistic reign of terror in the 
meantime.156  
Ideologically, the fanatical Wahabit felt very related to the Islamism of the 
Taliban.157 As Julie Sirrs points out, the Taliban were “sheltering bin Laden first and 
foremost because of a shared worldview.“158  Both the Saudi Arabian and also the 
Afghan Islamists vigorously ward off all intellectual influences from the West – the only 
innovations which are welcome to them are highly developed weapons and similar 
engineering. Bin Laden started bringing Arabic “warriors of belief” into the country 
again. Quickly, his forces and his monetary support became a pillar of the Taliban’s 
power. According to a British document of 2001,  
 
Bin Laden has provided the Taliban regime with troops, arms and money 
to fight the Northern Alliance. He has representatives in the Taliban 
military command structure. He has also given infrastructure assistance 
and humanitarian aid.159 
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These vassals decidedly helped to stabilize the Taliban rule against all uprisings 
of hostile tribes and to extend practically all over Afghanistan.160 This was the origin of 
an alliance between al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which soon felt strong enough to challenge 
the West. Consequently, on November 9, 1998 the Taliban warned the American 
government that “the United States indictment of bin Laden would endanger Americans 
in the Muslim world and spark a storm of anger against the United States.”161 
Well hidden in the inaccessible mountain valleys, bin Laden was able to expand 
his organization even further and also to intensify the contacts to Islamistic movements in 
other countries, which had already been established. Now, an international network, 
which was in a better position than any before to exercise terror attacks on a large scale 




B. THE THREAT OF THE HOUSE OF UNBELIEF 
 
As we have seen, the Boxer Uprising can basically be explained by the colonial 
development of China and its consequences for the population and can thus be limited 
historically to a very short period, whereas the rivalry between the occident and the orient 
is much older and much more complex due to a long joint history. Originally, it came 
about with the question whether the whole world should be Christianized or Islamized in 
the sign of the only correct religion.162 In this context, cross or crescent moon was the 
glaring alternative. However, the modern Western industrial societies no longer know the 
central creed binding for all or a corresponding politically/secularly standardized form of 
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life, but a variety of ideologies, from religious to atheistic.163 Missioning other peoples 
became a concern of a religious minority, as many Christians, at least in Western Europe, 
would like a “dialogue” with those who believe differently rather than having conversion 
as their target. The hatred of Christian missionaries and their activities, which motivated 
the Boxer Movement in China to a decisive extent, does not play any role in the 
confrontation with Islamistic terror. The objective of the aggressive Christian mission has 
been replaced by a secular impulse to a mission of civilization in the West. In 1989, 
Francis Fukuyama stated in his famous article The End of History?: 
 
The Triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the 
total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism. 
[…] What we may be witnessing is […] the end of history as such: that is, 
the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization 
of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.164 
 
If the Cold War had been a confrontation between communism and liberal-
democratic capitalism, and if communism had collapsed, Fukujama supposed that 
liberalism, democracy, and capitalism must have been the victor and Western-style 
liberal democratic institutions provided the norm for states everywhere.165 If the entire 
world was not yet Western-type liberal, democratic, and capitalist, it would become so. 
Islamists, like the Boxers before, feel this domination by Western civilization as 
humiliating. Cultural resistance therefore appears for many Muslims as a quest for self-
respect. It is crucial to understand, that anti-Western rage among Muslims is not the result 
of a lack of knowledge about the Western culture. The problem is that they just not like 
what they see, because from the Islamist’s perspective, Western values reflect not a 
progress but a degeneration of culture. Due to the political, economic, technical, military 
and media superiority of the West, the Western model of civilization appears so 
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overpowering that it is sensed as a threat.166 In particular in the Moslem world, it 
overtaxes the ability to transformation of other cultures, especially as their own 
inferiority is sensed as being humiliating. 
Although a secular, worldly impulse to mission has replaced the religious one in 
the West, the conflict between the occident and the orient has by no means lost any of its 
sharpness. Whereas we can hardly speak of the “Christian Occident” any more, the term 
“Islamic Orient” has not lost its justification. In this cultural area, the people actually do 
still mainly live in a society with a religious/political structuring.167 Secularization has 
hardly taken place in the Islamic world, if at all then only in approaches.168 And it is 
precisely this difference – either religion as an obligating middle and scale of the society 
or as a private matter of each individual – which now means the main difference between 
Orient and Occident for many Moslems.169 For them, the question of the extent to which 
they are to sense a “westernization” of their cultural sphere as an enrichment or as a 
threat has gained central importance.170 
What all Islamic movements have in common is that they do not put the demise of 
the individual Islamic states down to the structural crises in their own society – but to the 
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expansion of the West and the “westernization” of Moslem societies.171 The Moslems, 
and this is the message of the Islamists, have allowed themselves to be tempted into 
taking on elements on Western philosophy and society. The Islamist Leaders, so Mark 
Juergensmeyer, “regard as especially pernicious the fact that the cultural colonialism of 
Western ideas erodes confidence in traditional values. For that matter, it also undermines 
traditional religious constructs of society and the state.”172 
Although the Islamists want to take on the technical achievements of the West, by 
no means do they want ideas from philosophy and state organization. Here, the reaction 
patterns of the Islamic world have a striking similarity with those of the Chinese a 
century before. The fact that both the Chinese boxers and also the Moslems nowadays 
sense frustration about the insufficient performance of their own governments is 
inconsiderable. Although many problems are/were homemade and self-caused, 
Boxers/Islamists always made/make the West responsible for their own plight. The pitiful 
situation of Chinese society of the last Empire was portrayed as a result of Western 
intrigues, just as this is done in the modern Moslem world. It is always the West's fault, 
be it defeats, missionaries, droughts and famine or also decadence, exploitation, the fate 
of the Palestinians, drugs, poverty or Aids.173 The “intellectual aggression” of the West, 
the new “crusader mentality”, with which it tries to assert its values from liberal market 
economy down to women's emancipation, deprives the Moslems of their values, the 
Islamists say, and make them compliant imitators of non-Islamic forms of thinking and 
living. Bernard Lewis writes on the hatreds of the Muslim world against “the West”: 
 
At times this hatred goes beyond hostility to specific interests or actions or 
policies or even countries and becomes a rejection of Western civilization 
as such, not only what it does but what it is, and the principles and values 
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that it practices and professes. These are indeed seen as innately evil, and 
those who promote or accept them as the “enemies of God.174 
 
Just as little as the Chinese Boxers were, Taliban and al-Qaeda are not primarily 
the organizational manifestation of political ideas or the avant-garde of social powers, 
Instead, they embody an anti-American and anti-West feeling of life highly propagated in 
the Islamic cultural sphere. Whereas the Boxer Uprising was the result of Western 
colonialism and its pressure of modernizing society, Islamistic terror is above all an 
expression of the rejection of globalization and its negative consequences for the position 
of the Islamic civilization in the world. As Bassam Tibi summarizes:  
 
The globalization process unfolding in the course of European expansion 
proved Western civilization to be more competitive, and severely 
challenged Islam. Contemporary Muslims feel that the West has deprived 
Islam of its core function, that is, to lead humanity.175 
 
Globalization leads to the Western world coming closer and closer to the 
Moslems without the majority profiting from its benefits. More than the previous 
generation, young well-educated Moslems nowadays recognize the enormous difference 
between prosperity in the West and their own poverty.176 Therefore, globalization is not 
regarded as a chance, but a threat in large parts of the Islamic world, as a new attempt by 
the West to exercise power and to patronize the Moslems. Terror is based on inequalities, 
sensed by those affected as being unjust, for which purpose we need no al-Qaeda. The 
attempt to portray the Taliban and al-Qaeda as widely branched organizations with their 
boss Osama bin Laden is therefore the helpless and desperate attempt by the West to give 
terror a face. It is the helpless attempt to stand an idea up against the wall and to shoot it 
by order of court martial. 
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C. RELIGIOUS ORIGINS 
 
It has been seen that the Boxer Uprising had a religious motivation and 
legitimization to a considerable extent. The Christian missionaries and their converts 
formed an important target for hatred. In the case of Islamism, religious reservations form 
the core of resistance against the West even more strongly. Basically, the Moslems ought 
to have been able to encounter the spiritually related religion all the more impartially, the 
more the churches lost their political influence in the West. However, the opposite is the 
case. In the case of militant Islamism and terror in the name of Allah, the situation is 
more complicated.  
Islam not only offers moral scales of value for all areas of private, religious and 
public life, it also provides concrete instructions for actions in everyday life.177 The 
Koran and the sunna of the prophet Mohammed form the guideline for every part of life. 
The Islamists believe in the universality of their religion, i.e. they would like the sharia, 
the Islamist order of law and values, to apply all over the world. Islamism is not the 
traditional practice of the religion, but its modern distortion for ideological purposes. As 
Robbert Woltering points out in his contribution The roots of Islamic popularity, all 
Islamist groups have in common the desire to “Islamize” society and “to change the very 
basic of the social fabric.” It is the belief of Islamists, so Woltering, that there was today 
no society in the world that lives according to the principles of Islam, and that this was a 
bad thing:  
 
As to the political aspect of their desire, all Islamists have in common the 
conviction that sooner or later the realm of politics will have to be altered 
fundamentally. Islamisation may start at the bottom, or it may be 
implemented from above, but it is clear that any Islamisation of society 
cannot be complete until the existing political system of the country in 
question is replaced with a usually undefined – Islamic one.178 
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Even if there are differences of opinion amongst Islamists about whether violence 
(or also terror) is permitted for the assertion of their own religious objectives under 
certain circumstances, and also at which point in time, the totalitarian core of Islamism is 
obvious: it permits neither democracy nor pluralism, neither rights of defense of the 
people against the state nor separation of powers, neither freedom of the press nor a state-
free private sphere. On the contrary, each person is to be covered by the universal validity 
of the religion. An individual can neither leave nor criticize the umma, the association of 
the believers, without being declared an outlaw and a betrayer by a fatwa, a religious 
legal analysis.179 
As stated above, the West has stopped its missionary efforts to a great extent. We 
can no longer speak of efforts by the West to Christianize the Moslem world. But it is 
precisely the frequent absence of religion in the globalized culture of the West in which 
the Islamists see an even greater and more perfidious threat for the Islamic world.180 A 
civilization like the Moslem one, which does not recognize a separation of state and 
church and in which religiousness is not a private matter for each single individual, must 
feel challenged in his deepest core by a culture which provides exactly this alternative.181 
Therefore, the Islamists are not accusing the West of efforts to convert them to 
Christianity, but instead the precise opposite, i.e. its assumedly "godless" nature. 
According to Osama bin Laden, the West is “the modern world’s symbol of paganism, 
America and its allies.”182  
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Mark Juergensmeyer quotes, an Interview he has done with Mahmud 
Abouhalima, who was complained to have been the “mastermind“ of the World Trade 
Center bombing in 1993: 
 
Abouhalima made it clear that America’s involvement in religious politics 
– the support for the state of Israel and for ‘enemies of Islam’ such as 
Egypt’s Mubarak – is not the result of Christianity. Rather, it was due to 
America’s ideology of secularism, which Abouhalima regards not as 
neutrality but as hostility toward religion, especially Islam. […] I asked 
him if the United states would be better off if it had a Christian 
government. ‘Yes,’ Abouhalima replied, ‘at least it would have morals’.183 
 
The most extreme form of this way of thinking is satanization. The process of 
satanization indicates that the secular West is still seen as a religious entity, albeit a 
sinister one. The Muslim world would suffer under the wheeling and dealing of a 
conspiratorial Western network, which vastness and power could be explained only by its 
supernatural force. During the early days of the first Gulf War, the Palestinian Islamic 
movement, Hamas, issued as communiqué stating that the U.S. “commands all the forces 
hostile to Islam and the Muslims.” It singled out George Bush, who, it claimed, was not 
only “the leader of the forces of evil” but also “the chief of the false gods.”184 
A central demand repeatedly made in the West is that of a democratization of 
Islam. For Islamists and also for many convinced followers of Islam, this apparently 
simple demand is not possible. Unlike the West, where politics and religion were two 
different spheres in their origin, partly being united in the middle Ages and separated 
again in modern times, the Islamic view of the world was aimed from the outset at state 
and religion not being separated from one another. Amongst the founders of religion, 
Mohammed has a special position in that he was also a soldier and a statesman alongside 
his function as the highest religious authority. In the Islamic view, there are thus no two 
spheres which one could separate today. In Western thinking, man forms the centerpiece 
of the world. As a creation and simultaneously a partner of God, he has inviolable rights. 
On the other hand, only God is at the center according to oriental thinking. A separation 
                                                 
183  Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious Violence, Berkeley 
2003, p. 69. 
184  Hamas communiqué, January 22, 1991, quoted after Jean-Francois Legrain, A Defining Moment: 
Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism, in James P. Piscatori (ed.), Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf 
Crisis, Chicago 1991, p. 76. 
63 
between the secular and the religious sphere of life is therefore not possible, the attempt 
alone is blasphemy.185 
The fact that the suicide attackers of September 11 were above all religiously 
indoctrinated and motivated is proven by the “Final Instructions” found in their baggage. 
In which it is said: 
 
All of their equipment and gates and technology will not prevent, nor 
harm, except by God’s will. The believers do not fear such things. The 
only ones that fear it are the allies of Satan, who are the brothers of the 
devil. They have become their allies… Remember that his is a battle for 
the sake of God. As the prophet, peace be upon him, said, ‘An action for 
the sake of God is better than all of what is in the world’. […] Do not seek 
revenge for yourself. Strike for God’s sake.186 
 
Such a document refutes the opinion that the terrible attack on the USA had 
nothing to do with religion and nothing to do with Islam. Well-meaning politicians and 
intellectuals in Western states have attempted a strict separation of religion and terrorism, 
in order to protect Islam against its declared opponents.187 A number of liberal Moslems 
endeavored to assure Western media that these terrorists did not believe in God, the 
messages of the prophets, the Koran, that they were not real Moslems. But the authors of 
the “Final Instructions” are as religious as the authors of Christian crusading propaganda 
once were: in both cases, the calls for genocide on the non-believers, martyrdom as a 
particular virtue, in both cases crimes which are expressly to be committed by divine 
order. In both cases, we are dealing with a perversion, not with a negation of the 
religious. Subjectively, precisely such fantasists understand themselves as particularly 
devout believers, highly superior to the others as regards religious steadfastness and 
willingness to sacrifice. 
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D. PUBLIC SUPPORT AND SOCIAL COMPOSITION 
 
If one quite generally formulates the concern of the Islamists as the realization of 
an “Islamic” order, which is to create unity, strength and justice in a situation of apparent 
weakness, one can more easily understand why people from all levels of society feel 
attracted by Islamism and its foremost position against the West. Shireen Hunter quotes 
in this context the Muslim professor Eddin Ibrahim who pointed out that Islamism has 
become “an idiom for expressing profound worldly grievances and the quest for the good 
life here on earth.”188 
In Moslem societies, a new turn towards Islam has taken place with tremendous 
dynamism. In this context, Samuel Huntington has spoken of an “Islamic resurgence”. To 
start with, it has very little to nothing to do with an export of revolution or with violence 
and terror. Instead, the Islamic resurgence is a broad intellectual, cultural, social and 
political reflection which has taken hold of almost all the Islamic world. Without doubt, it 
is an attempt to cope with modernization and the Western pressure on civilization.189 The 
causes of the renaissance of the religion are urbanization, social mobilization, increased 
communication and media consumption as well as the increase in interaction with 
Western and other cultures.  
This Islamic arousal, which can be seen all over the world, can be seen in the 
increased attention to religious rites, the propagation of religious publications, cassettes 
and TV programs, the strong emphasis on Islamic clothing and an increase of Islamic 
education in Koran schools, but also the Islamization of regular schools, also in the 
increase in efforts to replace Western law by Islamic law and to use religious language 
and symbols more often. Islam is no longer just a religion, but becomes an extensive 
form of life. Then, it is only one further step until the state institutions completely 
subscribe to Islam and thus the total presence of the religion in all areas becomes a 
reality. 
However, it does not become clear from the start where the difference between 
Islamists and “normal” Moslems is, who also regard the Koran and the sunna as the 
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foundation of their own belief and generally also endeavor to align their conduct to 
Islamic values. In fact, the border is not easy to draw, which also explains the support of 
the Islamists by large parts of the population and the at least partial identity of their 
respective objectives. The relationship to politics and law does however give indications 
of the existence of specifically Islamistic convictions, “Islamists” regarding religion, law 
and politics as an inseparable unit and wanting private and public life to be exclusively 
based on Islamic standards and values. The brief formula for this is “Application of the 
sharia”, which means implementation of the order of law and values derived from the 
Koran and the sunna. It entails not only statutory regulations concerned with domestic, 
inheritance or criminal law, but also quite everyday matters ranging from hygiene to 
clothing. Whereas the majority of the Moslems do not question the validity of “Islamic 
values”, they do not want the provisions of the Islamic law to be applied to the present 
without further ado and scholars of law and religion and the leaders of Islamistic 
movements to decide on the social and political order of their country. Most of them wish 
for a society founded on Islamic values, but not an “Islamic state” along the lines of Iran, 
Saudi Arabia or even Afghanistan – up to the winter of 2001. 
Nevertheless, the Islamistic terror attacks on Western targets enjoyed an 
undeniable sympathy and wide support in large parts of the Moslem world. The support 
of the Boxer Movement in China and the support of the Islamists had a lot to do with the 
defense against foreign, i.e. Western powers and ideas and even more with the defense 
against Western dominance. Islamism is generally considered a protest movement within 
the Moslem societies aiming for orientation, sense and self-respect against social 
injustice, cultural alienation and collective powerlessness, which in the end are put down 
to the effects of powers hostile to Islam.190 The aim of maintenance or regaining an 
independent, Islamically determined identity played and plays a bearing role in the 
context during the periods of the anti-colonial battle for liberation. From an Islamic view, 
the threat comes from the outside, an estimation shared by most Moslems: the intellectual 
aggression of the West, the new “crusader mentality,” with which the West tries to assert 
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its values from liberal market economy down to women's emancipation, deprives the 
Moslems of their traditional values, some of which have an archaic touch, and makes 
them compliant imitators of non-Islamic forms of thinking and living.191   
It has been shown that the Boxers, like most Chinese secret alliances, pursued 
decidedly anti-dynastic objectives at the start of their movement. This attitude hostile to 
the authorities also applies to the Islamists. Similar to the Boxers, they regard their 
governments as corrupted by the West and as incapable of defying the cultural threat of 
Western globalization. The criticism of the Islamists is also simultaneously directed 
against their own elites, which came to power after achievement of independence in the 
Islamic countries. Their accusation is that they have failed right down the line. Whereas 
the Boxers saw evidence for the fact that their “Mandate of Heaven” has expired in the 
permanent military defeats of the Manchu and their increasing compromises towards the 
“foreign devils”, the Islamists explain the current state of weakness of the Moslem world 
with the betrayal of Islam and its doctrines and as a result of the “westernization” of the 
ruling elites.192 For them, Western supremacy and the decline of the Muslim world 
appeared as the divine punishment for straying from the path of Islam. Western 
domination was explained as a result of alienation of the Islamic world from Islam. 
Buruma/Margalit thus argue that the fault lines of the worldwide clash of civilizations 
“do not coincide with national, ethnic, or religious borders” and that “the fiercest battles” 
would be fought inside the Muslim world.193 To illustrate the view of foreign domination 
“as a sign of the wrath of God” Henry Munson quotes a statement “by a marginally 
literate peddler from Tangier”: 
 
Why did God allow the Christians to rule over the house of Islam? Why 
did God allow the Jews to take Palestine and holy Jerusalem? Why does 
God allow the Christians to live like sultans in our land while we are like 
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slaves in their land? This is God’s punishment and this is God’s test. 
Muslims have left the path of Islam.194 
 
“Islam is the solution” is therefore the motto of the Islamists, with which they 
mobilize against critics and opponents.195 In order to bring about the intellectual/moral 
turn-around to lead out of the general plight, Islam must firstly be urged of the 
falsifications and “inadmissible” innovations which have deformed and unshaped it in the 
course of the centuries. Reformed Islam will cause the spirit of the early times to arise in 
the community of the Moslems, in which it was strong, unified and irresistible 
strengthened by belief, and will retain its leading position in the world which it had for 
centuries. It is this combination of moral and political appeal, the promise of individual 
fulfillment, collective liberation and setting up of past historical greatness again which 
makes Islamism so attractive for many people, especially amongst the scholars. 
Bernard Lewis pertinently described this uncertainty within the Moslem world, 
with a view to the West appearing to be overpowering, as the “crisis of Islam.”196 Within 
the Moslem societies, it is above all the youths who are feeling the force of this crisis of 
Islam with all its sharpness. For example, the population of Algeria has trebled in three 
decades: from 9 million in the year of 1963 to about 28 million 30 years later. The growth 
in the Egyptian population is almost 2.1 per cent per year according to information from 
the German World Population Foundation (DSW).197  In just short of four decades, the 
number of Egyptians rose from 24.9 million (1965) to 74.7 million (2003).198 No national 
economy is so dynamic that it could adapt its potentials to such a growth in citizens, all of 
whom demand work, a place to live and the other commodities of daily life. The real per 
capita income in the Arabic world fell by 2 per cent per year in the last decade for this 
very reason – the greatest loss of income of all developing regions. More than 40 per cent 
of the under-24's in Algeria are out of work, even more than 80 per cent in Egypt. The 
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Arab Human Development Report 2002 written by an Arabic team of scientists by order 
of the United Nations establishes that 51 per cent of juveniles in Moslem countries “wish 
to emigrate to other, preferably Western countries and thus clearly express their 
dissatisfaction with the current conditions and their chances for the future.” 199 A trouble 
spot already in existence such as the large and growing number of well educated 
juveniles in the Islamic world without prospects can be mobilized easily – especially with 
simple explanations of this problem, like the Islamist offer.200 This mobilization is 
particularly easy if it can be well combined with factual and also subjectively felt 
offenses. The Islamic social systems do not appear to be flexible enough to integrate even 
a part of the angry young men and to demonstrate prospects for their lives to them. 
Thus, some scholars have sought to link poverty with Islamic terror. Poverty, they 
argue fosters terror because it creates a sense of hopelessness, restricts educational 
opportunity, and produces frustration over inequality.201 In fact, it is not poverty but the 
lack of possibilities of going up which rejects a reasonable status for the ambitious young 
generation. Therefore, the members of the so-called “youth bulge” are particularly 
dangerous, as they wish to come to terms with neither the option of an emigration into the 
West nor the opinion of a life in poverty. Daniel Pips concludes in his contribution God 
and Mammon: Does poverty cause Militant Islam?: “Like fascism and Marxism-
Leninism in their heydays, militant Islam attracts highly competent, motivated and 
ambitious individuals. Far from being the laggards of society, they are its leaders.” 
Unlike des Boxer, who recruited their masses from impoverished peasants in the 
countryside, the suicide attackers of September 11 were not young men from slums or 
refugee camps, out of work or socially uprooted, but well trained engineers and 
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students.202 At least four to six of the total of 19 terrorists involved belonged to these 
educated levels.203 These men, who formed the inner circle of the terror actions, had 
obtained university graduations in the USA or Germany and had never been conspicuous 
there via radically Islamistic comments.204 They came from a saturated bourgeois middle 
and upper class, their fathers were attorneys, businessmen, who supported their sons in 
the studies abroad.205 Thus, Michael Radu concludes: 
 
Nothing in the background of the Western-born or based Muslim terrorists 
supports the widespread fantasy that Islamic terrorism can somehow be 
explained by injustice, poverty, or discrimination. On the contrary, 
terrorism on the scale of the September 11 attacks requires elaborate 
coordination by multilingual, adaptable, and highly educated people. No 
impoverished, ignorant victims of Imperialism need apply.206 
 
Obviously, the conventional wisdom that “poverty does generate militant Islam“ 
is not true.207 The German sociologist Gunnar Heinsohn makes the following succinct 
formulation in his book Söhne und Weltmacht: “The terrorists do not come out of poverty 
and nutritional deficiencies. They don’t beg for bread. They kill for status and power”.208 
 
 
E. GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT 
 
“The Islamic world may be unified around certain political attitudes, i.e. its 
resentment and anger at the West, but it is not unified around any political power, i.e. a 
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set of strong and effective states,” James Kurth emphasizes.209 Thus, the Islamic world is 
lacking a leading power which could transform the popular Islamist’s movement into an 
inter-state war, as the Manchu did with the Boxer movement. However, both the Boxer 
movement and also the militant Islamists enjoyed (and still obviously enjoy) state 
support.  
The inexperienced Arabic Mujaheddin and the Afghan fighters who fought 
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan were schooled by the Saudi Arabian 
government with money, by the US government with weapons and by the Pakistani and 
American secret services in dealing with the modern weapons. While the U.S. 
government was committed to contain Soviet expansionism, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia 
supported the Taliban’s “aim to propagate militant Sunni Islam northward into Central 
Asia and the Russian Caucasus.”210 None of the governments and secret services had any 
idea at that time of the development which they were promoting with their activities. 
Although the strategists knew that their money, weapons and technical know-how were 
mainly supporting radically Islamic groupings who formed permanent trouble spots in 
their countries of origin, both the Pakistanis and also the Americans and Saudis believed 
that they could keep the ideologically and regionally highly different groupings under 
control and also play them off against one another tactically if need be.211  
The Ch’ing had also attempted to instrumentalize the popular mass movement of 
the Boxers for their own political objectives. But whereas it was a question of the actual 
displacement of the “foreign devils” from China for the Manchu, the Americans wanted 
to stop the expansion of the Soviet power territory. For Pakistan, it was a question of 
influence in the neighboring country, for the Saudis religious and political influence in 
the region. But unlike the Manchu, even the Islamists who called for the “holy war” 
against “the West” did not wish to dispel all Christians and Jews from the Moslem states. 
Above all, the objective of the Islamists is to push the political/civilization influence of 
the West, the “modern crusader mentality” away vigorously. These differing ideas of 
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objectives can be explained with the past of the two civilizations and their historical 
experience with the West. Whereas the Chinese had hardly any or only vague knowledge 
of the West for centuries and would most have preferred to reinstate this happy original 
situation before the “Fall of Man”, contact with the West, such a solution in the 
relationship of the Moslem and Western world is ruled out due to the geographical 
proximity alone and also due to a longer and more intensive joint past. The Islamists are 
prepared to accept Christians and Jews as “wards”, strictly hierarchically subordinated to 
the Islamic supremacy.  
After the Soviets had withdrawn their troops from Afghanistan in 1988 and thus 
the enemy from the outside was missing, the individual Afghan tribes returned to their 
former rivalry and started to combat one another again. The same also applied for the 
various Islamist groupings. In addition, the “warriors of belief” from other Islamic 
countries with different languages and cultures were no longer regarded as allies, but 
rather as competitors and troublemakers by the Afghans. Disappointed, thousands of 
them withdrew back to their home countries. When they arrived there, many of them saw 
that they had again been isolated socially and did not find sufficient understanding with 
their fanatism of a "holy war", either with their governments or with the mass of the 
population. So those returning from Afghanistan increasingly aimed their annoyance 
against the upper class of their home country, whose politicians and social elite they 
regarded as being only “half’-Moslems or even as “non-believers” on account of their 
economical and cultural connections to Western states.  
Osama bin Laden also got into a conflict with the Saudi government in this way 
and became the enemy of his former sponsors. He sharply criticized their government, 
which asked the USA for support after the occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi troops and 
fetched more than 50,000 American soldiers into the country, of whom around 20,000 
also remained in Saudi Arabia after the victory of Saddam Hussein.212 Bin Laden 
reminded them of the saying of the prophet Mohammed that “non-believers” were never 
to have a permanent right to stay on the Arabic Peninsula, the origin of Islam. Thus, he 
appeared as a radical attorney of Wahabitic Islam, to whom the Wahabism of his 
government appeared too diluted, too full of compromises, even as a “betrayal of the real 
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Islam”. For the Saudi royal family, the uncomfortable critic became so dangerous that 
they expelled him from the country and even withdrew his Saudi nationality in 1994. In 
1992, bin Laden moved to Sudan, where he worked together with the Islamist 
government there. Back in Afghanistan, his organization continued to enjoy the support 
of parts of the Pakistani secret service.213 Tim Judah stressed hat the support by Pakistan 
played “a key role” in creating the Taliban, “which then became its very own 
Frankenstein’s monster.”214  Many members of the Saudi royal family, it is presumed, 
continued to support al-Qaeda with money and contributions in kind until the year of 
2001.215 
Finally, the Taliban regime provided al-Qaeda with a safe haven for training 
camps, logistics and resting. In fact, the Taliban-al-Qaeda cooperation was a perfect and 
almost unique symbiosis. While the terror organization needed the shelter of the Taliban, 
they themselves were weak enough to be depended on Osama bin Laden for their 
financial and military survival. Michael Radu saw in this very special cooperation 




F. THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR AGAINST (ISLAMIC) TERROR 
 
For many months before the Uprising started and Boxers began to kill Chinese 
Converts and Western missionaries, Western diplomats had known about the seriousness 
of the threat posed by angry Chinese peasants and an overall hostile Chinese population. 
Likewise, the threat of Islamic terrorism against the United States and other Western 
countries has been worrying policy-makers for years, and there have been numerous 
panels, reports, task forces, and committees that have sounded an alarm. But in the 
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context of foreign- and defense-policy priorities, terrorism was seen by the Western 
governments a one of several important competing priorities. In the domestic context, 
tracking down potential terrorists continued to be balanced very carefully and properly 
against the presumption against unwarranted invasion of privacy and imposition on civil 
liberties. There was a cost to making the West safer from terrorist acts – a cost that would 
have required considerable political capital. 
As shown, the first attacks of the Boxers were aimed above all against symbols of 
the Western civilization and against the Chinese converts who were regarded as the “fifth 
column” of Western imperialism. The targets of the attacks by al-Qaeda on September 
11, 2001 were selected purposefully due to their symbolic significance. Whereas the 
Boxers in China attacked telegraph lines, railway lines and Christian churches as 
testimonies of the foreign influence in the country, al-Qaeda chose the symbols of the 
political, economic and military power of the West's leading nation as their targets with 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Not only was the “holy war” carried into the 
center of the sole remaining superpower and the West's leading nation, but with the 
World Trade Center a landmark of the American capitalism and “imperialism”, an 
outstanding symbol of modern globalization was hit. Finally, with the Pentagon, the 
military command center of the “Great Satan America” was directly attacked. The fourth 
passenger jet which was kidnapped was apparently to hit a symbol of the political culture 
of America, the U.S. Congress. In this way, al-Qaeda – this was to be the signal effect – 
has proven, visible for all “suppressed believers”, that the most powerful state in the 
world and with it the West as an entity were vulnerable. The American scholar and 
sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer therefore rightly analyzes these terror acts as 
 
forms of public performance rather than aspects of political strategy. 
These are symbolic statements aimed at providing a sense of 
empowerment to desperate communities. The collapse of the twin towers 
of the World Trade Center must have created a heady illusion of power to 
those who conspired to bring them down.217 
 
Bruce Lincoln goes a step further with his interpretation. He regards the objective 
of the terrorists “to demonstrate that […] they possessed a power infinitely superior to 
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their adversaries and of an entirely different order.” Lincoln deduces that people 
subjected to such an attack “were presumably meant first to surrender and thereafter to 
refashion their culture after that of the victors.”218 
So to start with, Boxers and Islamists looked for low-risk targets with high 
symbolic power for their militant and terrorist challenge of the West. The self-assurance 
of the West, its trust in its own strength and moral superiority were to be hit.219 The 




G. THE WEST’S RESPONSE 
  
In the months after the attacks of September 11, the USA started their “War on 
Terror”, initially being able to count on the extensive support of their allies in Europe. 
The first objective within this war was to depose the regime of terror of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and the terror organization al-Qaeda protected by them, which was made 
responsible for the terror attacks. 
On October 7, the President of the USA, George W. Bush, declared in his 
”Address to the Nation" that the United States had started with military attacks on “al-
Qaeda terrorist camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.”221 
The President made clear that the USA were being supported in this by other Western 
states, which also provided troops and equipment. He named Canada, Australia, 
Germany, France and above all Great Britain. Bush emphasized that this was not a attack 
against the Afghan people or against Islam. Instead, the USA was combating “those who 
aid terrorists”, and those “barbaric criminals who profane a great religion by committing 
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murder in its name.”222 Accordingly to the U.S. President, the offensive targeted against 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was “a part of our campaign against terrorism, another 
front in a war that has already been joined through diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing 
of financial assets and the arrests of known terrorists b law enforcement agents in 38 
countries.”223 
Even if the USA are bearing the main load of the fight against the Islamist, this 
statement makes clear that, like the quashing of the Boxers, the war against Islamic terror 
is regarded by the West as being a joint task, as the threat is not limited to individual 
Western countries. This view of things was confirmed by the fact that the NATO - above 
all an alliance of occidental states, despite Turkey's membership - declared the 
occurrence of an alliance incident pursuant to Art. 5 of the NATO treaty and assured the 
USA (above all political) support in the fight against the Islamists. Even if the USA was 
given help by non-Western countries in the months after the attacks on September 11, it 
is unmistakable that the majority of these states interpreted the acts of terror of the 
Islamists as primarily being a fight against the West, which only affected them 
conditionally, despite the efforts of the USA, as Paul Rogers states: 
 
Beyond the initial support fort he United States from European states after 
11 September, there was a degree of support from many other countries, 
but it has to be said that opinion in the ‘majority world’, away from the 
countries of the Atlantic community, was always far less supportive of the 
United States.224 
  
In the crusade against the Taliban in Afghanistan, three factors can be seen which 
were decisive for its outcome and the current situation225: 
- To start with, it must be seen that the USA were able to make use of the 
opposition, the so-called “Northern Alliance”, who were already in a civil war 
with the Taliban, in the fight against the latter and the al-Qaeda fighters.226 
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Taliban and al-Qaeda were hopelessly inferior to the combined air power of 
the USA, which carried out bombardments and used cluster ammunition on a 
large scale, and the ground troops of the Northern Alliance. According to a 
report by the Pentagon, American military aircraft flew a total of 21,500 
deployments by March 2002, throwing about 17,400 bombs. Over and above 
this, the USA generously equipped the troops of the Northern Alliance with 
war material and goods in the weeks leading up to October 7. These weapons 
are now in the hands of the warlords and mean a serious problem for the 
central government which has been installed in the meantime. 
- Before the start of its crusade in Afghanistan, the U.S. government 
presupposed that al-Qaeda was using its camps in Afghanistan predominately 
to train terrorists for use in Western and Islamic countries. In fact, however, 
most of the camps were used to train militiamen for the Afghan civil war on 
the side of the Taliban. It was seen that Afghanistan was much less important 
as an operation and training base or as a logistic center for al-Qaeda than had 
been assumed. 
- The third and most significant factor was the circumstance that both the 
Taliban and also the al-Qaeda militia withdrew from any direct and open 
confrontation with the American armed forces and also avoided fighting the 
Northern Alliance to a great extent. Instead, they regularly withdrew with a 
view to superior forces and went underground in towns and villages, taking 
their weapons and supplies with them. This strategy became particularly clear 
to the public in the nighttime evacuation of Kabul by the Taliban on 
November 13, 2001. 
 
The war against the Taliban was formally ended on December 23 with the 
installation of the interim government under Hamid Karsai. In negotiations between 
various tribal leaders of the "Northern Alliance" and Afghan exile groups in Bonn, a 
schedule for the return to a stable situation without the participation of Islamists was 
passed. The most important integral part of the plan was the appointment of a special 
Loya Jirga, a kind of meeting of all tribal princes in order to form a final government and 
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to resolve a constitution for the country. But as early as January 2002, fights flared up 
again between rivaling tribes and warlords.227  Two days before, the UN Security 
Council had resolved the dispatch of a defense troop to Afghanistan. In the course of the 
operation “Enduring Freedom”, around 5,000 UN soldiers from a total of 18 nations were 
to ensure peace in Afghanistan. 
Despite the presence of the ISAF, the name of the UN forces in Kabul, and 
despite massive military presence on the part of the USA and Great Britain, it was not 
possible to prevent a gradual consolidation of the Taliban in the South and East of the 
country.228 It was also not possible to capture Osama bin Laden and high-ranking leaders 
of al-Qaeda, whose abode is still presumed in Afghanistan and the border area to 
Pakistan. The actual objective of the war, destruction of the al-Qaeda network, was 
therefore only conditionally achieved. The war on terror is continuing undiminished, 
reaching a new peak with the occupation of Iraq by the USA and Great Britain in 2003. 
In the course of this paper, it has been seen that the West has again decided on 
joint action, as was also the case against the Boxers. As in China, the West was also able 
to assert itself militarily against the Islamists without difficulties. Although the 
government of the USA and its Western allies always emphasize that a successful 
strategy for combating terrorism also required diplomatic, economic and police means, 
the West is above all trusting in its military superiority, as in the quashing of the Boxer 
uprising. After short and extremely effective military victories which proved the 
supremacy of U.S. and Western military technology, The United States and the West are 
facing now long-term nation-building efforts which ultimate outcome remains unclear.229 
A removal of the deeper causes of the “uprising against the West” was postponed to the 
time after a military success both in 1900 and also now in 2003. 
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V. CRISIS MANAGEMENT BY THE WEST 
A. PUTTING DOWN THE REBELLION 
 
1. The West’s Objectives 
 
The West's first reaction to reports of massacres amongst Christians and 
missionaries in China and the siege and alleged slaughter of the embassy personnel are 
purely not by chance similar to the dismay with which the Western world heard the news 
of the al-Qaeda terror attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center. In both 
cases, the disdain of man and the terrorist aspect of the deeds moved people. Both actions 
hit the heart of the West's cultural self-understanding and thus triggered considerable 
fears. In addition, the West felt challenged in its entirety and its core of civilization by 
both these attacks.  
The outbreak of the Boxer uprising appeared to many Europeans, Americans and 
Japanese to be an outrageous breach of international law and further proof of the fact that 
the government and civil service in China were not serious about fulfilling the treaties. 
These arguments made a particular impression in Germany after Ambassador von 
Ketteler had been murdered in Peking by regular Chinese soldiers. Emperor Wilhelm II 
took up this incident in his infamous “Hun Speech.”230 Making use of a cultural 
argument, he put the fact that the Chinese dared to “overthrow millennia of international 
law and to scorn the holiness of the ambassadors and the holiness of hospitality in such a 
despicable way” down to the fact that Chinese culture had not been built up on 
Christianity.231 This conviction was closely connected with the rhetoric of the “Yellow 
Peril,” which Wilhelm had started himself. People who knew China personally and 
sensed certain sympathies for the resistance of the Chinese towards imperialism, such as 
the former German military consultant in Nanjing, Robert Löbbecke, saw the Boxer 
Uprising as the “outbreak of long-subdued volcanic passions” and the “deeds of fanatical 
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crowds over whom no-one can exercise control.”232 The general comparison of Western 
culture on the one hand and Chinese barbarism on the other in the year 1900 finds a cor-
respondence in the words used by the American President in his distinction between 
“good” and “evil” and between law and terrorism in 2001.233 In a speech two weeks after 
September 11, Italy's prime minister renewed the watchword already issued in the West 
during the Boxer uprising of the superior civilization of the West:  
 
We should be conscious of the superiority of our civilization, which 
comprises a system of values which has given people broad prosperity in 
the countries […] and which guarantees respect of human rights and 
religion. This respect doubtless does not exist in the Moslem countries. 
[…] The West will continue to westernize the world and conquer the 
peoples.234 
 
In the case of the Boxers, the West was united to a great extent in two demands. 
Alongside retribution for the crimes committed by the Chinese, the Chinese people were 
to be taught a lesson which should keep it from similar crimes in the future. In the 
perception of most Europeans, the Chinese had descended into barbarism, not only due to 
their breach of international law, but also due to the fanaticism ascribed to the Boxers.235 
This is precisely the point on which analogies to the fight against modern Islamic 
terrorism can be seen, as it is the religious fundamentalism that offends the secular and 
rational state culture of the West. 
So from an international law point of view, the Boxer Uprising was an 
“intervention” on the part of the West, a selective interference in the so-called “internal 
matters” of a state with, as a rule, a limited objective and limited duration. The 
prerequisite for such an action, as in the international fight against al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban, is the existence of a considerable imbalance of power. Both in the punishing 
expedition of the eight powers against the Boxers and also in the international war against 
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terror, a specific legitimization pattern was used, describing the action not in terms of a 
battle for power, but in those of creation of order. In this sense, the intervention against 
the Boxer Movement and its conclusion in the “Boxer Protocol” are a typical example for 
the pattern of action of collective intervention.236 In both cases, the difficulties of the 
victorious intervention powers in bringing their intervention to a conclusion are also 
interesting for a present analysis of the situation.  
 
2. Military Suppression 
 
The military intervention of the eight powers can be divided into three phases. 
Mid-June to August 1900, the foreigners captured in Tianjin and Peking were released. 
After this, until late autumn, the Province of Zhili – the Russian advance on Manchuria 
was an independent undertaking – was put under control by significantly so-called 
“punishment expeditions.” In the final phase between mid-December 1900 and April 
1901, expeditions were carried out almost solely by German troops. After participating in 
the initial punishment expeditions in the environment of Peking, the Americans withdrew 
quite quickly from these undertakings.237 In all three phases, the intervention force 
suffered from slight to non-existent operative coordination among the countries involved. 
The only reason why this had no devastating effect was that the international troops 
proved to be so superior that it is easier to talk of massacres in a number of battles with 
the Boxers and with the regular Chinese troops.238 All told, the intervention was carried 
out by the international force with vigor and ruthlessness, the scope of which caused 
severe criticism among contemporaries and was not really compatible with the civilizing 
claims of the West. An American Soldier who already took part at the war on the 
Philippines wrote to his sister: 
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There were hundreds [of Chinese] killed and wounded we gave no quarter 
nor asked for any so you see we took no prisoners we killed them all that 
fell into our hands.239 
 
Despite the brutal procedures of the expedition troops against the Chinese, there 
was also Chinese collaboration which was not without importance for the warfare. 
Coolies were recruited on site in the province of Zhili, and Chinese servants accompanied 
the civilians accompanying the punitive expeditions. The British even deployed Chinese 
soldiers on their side.240 In this case too, parallels to the battle against al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban can be seen. In their intervention, the USA took the option of taking sides in the 
long-running Afghanistan civil war and secured the support of the Northern Alliance, 
“even though the human rights record was little better than that of the Taliban.”241 
Contemporaries had difficulties in classifying the suppression of the Boxer 
uprising. Whether the proceedings can be described simply as war is questionable, at 
least from a jurisprudence point of view The European powers never formally declared 
war on China (like the USA on the Taliban later), and the Chinese “declaration of war” of 
June 21 was also not unambiguous. It did not represent a dispatch to the powers, but 
comprised a series of edicts in which the foreigners were given the blamed for the 
outbreak of the animosities, without clear reference to an actual state of war. As early as 
1913, Friedrich Kleine stated in a jurisprudence thesis that this had been a special case. 
He came to the conclusion that the suppression of the Boxer Uprising came very close to 
an “intervention turning into war” and that the collective action by the powers was 
consequently to be assessed as a “collective intervention.”242 The Chinese crusade was 
certainly more than “a comparatively modern task of a police rather than a warlike 
nature”, the objective of which was to “bring order into a chaos of wild barbarism and 
anarchy”.243 The deployment of the allied Western powers started as gunboat politics, 
and when its means were no longer sufficient, they started a procedure, which was 
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comparable with the colonial wars of that era in many regards – also in the cruelty of the 
warfare. The term “small war” doubtless circumscribes this form of war best of all, 
although guerrilla warfare to be classified underneath a general war has no longer been 
understood by this term since the Napoleonic wars, but expeditions of disciplined 
Western troops against “savages” and semi-civilized nations. As in the Second Opium 
War, the Chinese were also considered “semi-civilized” in this commitment. Experts and 
conflict researchers today forecast that this form of warfare will no longer be the 
exception, but the rule on the periphery of the Western hemisphere and at the seams of 
the cultural blocks, as in the campaign against Islamists. 
 
3. Cohesion and Problems of the Great Powers 
 
It must be said that the intervention force of the eight powers in China was not 
only multinational, but actually also multicultural as regards its composition. Richard 
O’Connor called the international relief force “one of the most laggard and cumbersome 
operations […] in modern history.”244 The British and French deployed a large number 
of colonial troops from India and Indochina. Some Western observers saw this as a 
unification of the races, from which the “Chinese hordes” were naturally excluded; others 
saw the “outside-race troops” with undisguised skepticism.245 So the intervention troops 
by no means appeared as the cultural unit for the defense of which they officially acted. 
Instead, the European colonial powers had deployed soldiers and ancillary troops from all 
the regions of their empires fight for the assumed superior civilization of the West.  
The cooperation among the individual nations left a lot to be desired and was also 
exacerbated by political differences.246 There were disputes about alleged offences or the 
right to use railway tracks or warehouses; violent clashes often being the result. Actions 
by individual nations were not permitted out of mistrust; a single-handed effort by the 
French to reach Baoding was prevented, and instead a multinational force commissioned 
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with capturing the town. The commander-in-chief of the allied troops, the German Field 
Marshal General Alfred Graf von Waldersee, wrote in his diary on November 20, 1900: 
“The interests of the European Powers are entirely different and co-operation between 
them on plain dealing lines is quite impossible.”247 Even if the co-operation among the 
Western nations in coping with conflicts has dramatically improved in the decades of the 
joint alliance of the NATO, a closer examination of the current multinational deployment 
in Afghanistan (ISAF and “Enduring Freedom”) shows that there are still similar 
coordination problems, mistrusting ogling and brushes between the nations involved. 
Diana Preston illustrates the problem as she writes: “More important, he [Admiral Sir 
Michael Seymour who led the first rescue attempt] knew that if he took command it 
would avoid British men having to serve under foreign command – as great a concern for 
Britain then as it is for the United States today.”248 
In general, the conduct of other nations' troops in China was regarded 
reproachfully: the Germans criticized the allegedly “Asiatic” warfare of the Russians; 
American missionaries particularly disapproved the conduct of the Russians and 
Japanese; the Japanese for their part complained about the Russians and particularly the 
Germans.249 Criticism of the German troops was possibly due to the fact that they carried 
out most of the punitive expeditions. However, it was particularly the Japanese or the 
colonial troops whom the Germans made accused of excesses as “heathens” or 
“Mohammedans”.250 
However, differences were not only according to the nationality, but also to 
differing professions. Soldiers not infrequently encountered missionaries with mistrust, 
because they had allegedly published exaggerated reports in European or American 
papers about the deployment of troops, but also vice versa, because they had unjustifiably 
accused Chinese civil servants of cooperation with the Boxers. In Tianjin, European 
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merchants complained to the English consul about the bombardment of the town because 
they saw their assets in danger – but to the annoyance of the British marine officer Bayly, 
who regarded this as neglect for the acute danger and mere “dollar-grinding.”251 
According to the same source, the inhabitants of the international settlement of Tianjin 
saw traitors in their ranks during the siege, allegedly having relations with the enemy. As 
a rule, these were people who had excessively close contacts to the Chinese, e.g. 
merchants, and had an excessively good opinion of them from the view of their 
opponents.252 
The materialization and the result of the Boxer Protocol, with which the 
intervention of the eight powers found its official end, reflect the unambiguously 
imperialistic character of the intervention and the lack of cohesion among the allies. For 
example, only solutions at the expense of the losers were asserted. There were no 
compromises between the claims of the allies, who jealously spied on one another.253 At 
the end of the intervention, there was the re-institution of all the European privileges 
attacked by the Boxers and a further weakening of China. 
The case study of the Boxer Uprising shows the difficulties that intervention 
powers have in bringing a military victory to a political/juristic conclusion. The current 
examples of Afghanistan and Iraq show that these problems do not result exclusively in 
interventions of a purely imperialistic nature. The actual problems appear to arise only 
after the military victory. The possibility of putting military power to advantage says 
nothing about the leeway for organization to be achieved this way. Power, in particular 
the superior power of intervening major forces, seduces into overestimating one's leeway 
for organization and pursuing maximum objectives that cannot be operationalized. British 
ideas with regard to a financial reform in China in 1901 and the merely sluggish set-up of 
functioning state structures in Afghanistan, which are additionally to be of a democratic 
nature, show how limited the organizational leeway were and still are. 
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 B. A “WAR ON TERROR” 
 
1. The West’s Objectives 
 
After the attacks of September 11, the American government avoided everything 
which could arouse the impression that they were waging war on the Moslem world as 
such or even “Islam” as a religion. Although Samuel Huntington has formulated the 
theoretical foundation for a dualistic leading position between the Christian-Jewish West 
on the one hand and the “Islamic civilizations” on the other with his “clash of 
civilization”, the governments and statesmen of the Western nations did not pay much 
attention to this.254 The Western world appears in its official statements to be conscious 
of the potential risks of such an interpretation of the Islamist threat. After the American 
President lapsed into speaking of a “crusade” to journalists in the first few weeks after the 
attacks (“This crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while”255), the Press 
Spokesman of the White House, Ari Fleischer, was quick to withdraw this selection of 
words again and apologized on behalf of the President: 
 
I think to the degree that that word has any connotations that would upset 
any of our partners or anybody else in the world, the president would 
regret if anything like that was conveyed. But the purpose of his 
conveying it is in the traditional English sense of the word. It’s a broad 
cause.256 
 
Before this, Moslem and European critics had warned against stylizing the fight 
against Islamist terror into a religious war. Le Parisian daily Le Monde warned: “If this 
‘war’ takes a form that affronts moderate Arab opinion, if it has the air of a clash of 
civilizations, there is a strong risk that it will contribute to Osama bin Laden’s goal: a 
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conflict between the Arab-Muslim world and the West.”257 It is crucial to understand that 
for Muslims, the memory of the Crusades lives on as the clearest example of militant 
Christianity, an earlier harbinger of the aggression and imperialism of the Christian West, 
a vivid reminder of Christianity’s early hostility toward Islam. If many regard Islam as a 
religion of the sword, Muslims down through the ages have spoken of the West’s 
Crusader mentality and ambitions. Therefore for Muslim-Christian relations, it is less a 
case of what actually happened in the Crusades than how they are remembered. 
In fact, it is above all the Islamists who are interested in portraying their terror as 
a part of a major conflict of two cultures as the defense of Islam and thus gaining the 
backing and the support of the Moslem masses. Thus, al-Qaeda endeavors to exaggerate 
its terrorist attacks as jihad, i.e. a religiously legitimized fight against the Western 
crusadership obligating all Moslems and as a defense of the assumedly attacked Islamic 
civilization.258 In his video message of October 7, 2001, Osama bin Laden repeated this 
interpretation immediately after the attacks of September 11 and spoke of the world being 
divided into two camps: “the camp of the faithful and the camp of the infidels. May God 
shield us and you from them”.259 In a further declaration after the death of three assumed 
terrorists in Pakistan, he appealed to all his brothers in belief all over the world in an 
undisguised allusion to Bush's use of the word “crusade”: 
 
We hope that these three brothers are among the first martyrs in Islam’s 
battle in this era against the new Christian-Jewish crusade led by the big 
crusader Bush under the flag of the Cross; this battle is considered one of 
Islam’s battles. We incite our Muslim brothers in Pakistan to give 
everything they own and are capable of to push the American crusade 
forces invading Pakistan and Afghanistan.260 
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In order not to reinforce this strategy of the Islamists further, the American 
President and also most other Western statesmen endeavor to avoid any indication that 
this war on terror could be a religious war. Instead, they try to gain allies amongst the 
Moslems for their fight against Islamic terror. As Bruce Lincoln states in his study “Holy 
Terror”, American (and Western) interests are better served by a strategy which permits 
Moslem nations “to enlist – or at least stay neutral – in a moral, but not religious 
campaign: one that pits civilization per se against all that is uncivilized, that is 
‘terrorism’, ‘fanatism’ and ‘evil’.”261 
However, it ought to be stated that with such a strategy the West is basically 
quoting itself because, as we have already seen, the quashing of the Boxer Uprising was 
primarily ennobled by the Western colonial powers as an act of civilization, as a fight 
against barbarism, terror and religious fanatism and also as a reinstitution of international 
law. The West has now only modified its reaction to the extent that it waives a sharp front 
position and thinking in military camps to a great extent. The Moslem states have been 
invited and requested to join the fight being waged by the West against Islamist terror. 
The suppression of the Boxers and the fight against Islamists still have the common point 
that the West considers itself to be superior as regards the civilization, but its action can 
therefore be assessed as legitimate, i.e. as an obligation.  
In militant Islamism, the West above all sees a powerful challenge to the existing 
order of the international system of secular nation states. As this institution is primarily of 
a Western origin, it is possible to refer to the Islamist terror against the Western formed 
international system of states as a “revolt against the West” with a certain justification, 
says Bassam Tibi in his work The Challenge of Fundamentalism.262 In fact, this 
circumstance contains one of the main problems of the West. For the West, it must be a 
question of maintaining the system of sovereign states with rational actions which it has 
created, as it is completely matched to its model of civilization and states. But Boxers and 
Islamists only conditionally act within these “Western” parameters. Their real risk is 
developed by them acting outside the system and operating with other methods. In 
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combating popular, non-state movements, however, the West cannot have recourse to the 
same methods as the terrorists without jeopardizing the system it has created.263  
 
2. Military Suppression 
 
In the months leading to the September 11 attacks, it seems clear that the West, in 
particular the U.S. government, understood the potential dangers posed by bin Laden and 
the al-Qaeda network. But they had little sense of how to deal with this brutal and 
ruthless version of militant Islamism. How could the nations of the West “meet and 
master” the new threat of Islamist terror? James Kurth and other Western scholars have 
suggested that the West should fight “on two different fronts” – a foreign front against al-
Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan and a domestic front “within the United States 
itself.”264 Interestingly, Kurth expected the war on the foreign front to be fought in a 
manner, which he described as “the Western way of war.“ This Western way of war was 
characterized, so Kurth, by 
 
(1) systematic organization combined with individual initiative at the unit 
level; (2) intense concentration of killing power achieved through the high 
technology of the time; and (3) ruthless and relentless continuation of the 
war until the enemy, or at least the ‘center of gravity’, is annihilated.265 
 
Field Marshall Graf von Waldersee would have agreed. Kurth precisely describes 
the kind of military strategy the West had chosen to suppress the Boxer rebellion. 
Obviously, the West has decided to wage the same type of war it has used then to counter 
today’s Islamist terror. Although other scholars like Barry R. Posen had predicted that in 
this war on terror “diplomacy will loom larger than military operations, and within 
military dimension, defensive activities will loom larger than offensive and punitive 
ones”, the U.S. strategy seems to emphasize the military dimension of this struggle.266 
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Despite the conventional wisdom, that this war cannot be won with military means alone, 
the United States fought within two years two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
War against the al-Qaeda terrorist network, however, was different than all other 
wars America and the West have ever fought before. It was a war against an amorphous, 
decentralized, privatized terrorism instead of a war primarily against formal states: 
 
Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda is a non-state organization, even if it has had 
working relationships with Pakistani, Iraqi or other nation’s intelligence 
services. As ghastly as their consequences were, the attacks reflected the 
work of a small band of operatives – fewer than a score directly, with a 
supporting infrastructure of a few hundred at the most. These were not the 
uniformed representatives of another country.267 
 
Although it can be argued that the campaign against the Boxer movement too was 
no classic war against a state, this kind of a non-state enemy was new to the Western 
countries. Islamic terror posed an unprecedented threat, because the usual rules of 
deterrence had no evident application. In military defense it can ordinarily assumed that 
an adversary can be dissuaded by increasing the cost of his action. The stability of the 
nuclear era depended on deterrence – the notorious “mutual assured destructive 
capability” of two state adversaries who wished to have their people and polity survive. A 
non-state actor such as al-Qaeda has no population held in thrall, and its cult of 
martyrdom sees death as unimportant.268 Thus, the task of the West became to anticipate 
and intercept specific operations, aided by disruption of the terrorist network’s 
infrastructure. 
Both non-state actors, Boxers and al-Qaeda, however, needed some kind of 
operational basis and governmental support in order to survive and to fight successfully 
their war against the West:  
 
[al-Qaeda] needs a territorial base for training camps and safe planning 
headquarters, two requirements that are obviously essential when one 
considers the thousands of militants trained in Afghanistan and the 
sophistication demonstrated in the 2000 attack on the USS Cole and the 
September 11 attacks. Hence the importance of the Taliban in                                                  
267  Cohen, A Strange War, p. 11. 
268  See Kurth, The War and the West, p. 326: „A transnational network can operate flexibly in many 
locales, not responsible for any one of them, hence without fixed interests at stake, making deterrence 
difficult.“ 
91 
Afghanistan, […], and access to Western European training, recruiting, 
and logistical opportunities.269 
 
This made it easier for the U.S. government to wage war against the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan and to explain it to their allies and the Western public. Hence, the 
Bush administration’s first strategy was to disrupt al-Qaeda by military means, using air 
power and limited ground forces to attack the network’s logistics and training centers in 
Afghanistan. Overthrowing the Taliban faction was also a signal to complicit Muslim 
regimes that might be tempted to shelter al-Qaeda.270 The response was approved by the 
United Nations Security Council271 and NATO272, as a campaign of self-defense against 
armed attack. 
Thus four month after September 11, and after a series of vigorous campaigns, the 
al-Qaeda network had been weakened but not destroyed; few of its leaders had been 
captured; and bin Laden had evaded search teams. But the Taliban regime of Afghanistan 
that had protected and handsomely bought off by bin Laden had fallen. The question then 
became where the U.S. antiterrorist campaign would move next. Once the focus on 
Afghanistan had passed, once the targets had become less clearly, however, the public 
debate in North America and Europe increasingly caused dissensus. 
 
3. Cohesion and Strategic Dissonances of the West 
 
The attacks on the United States on 11 September have had a significant impact 
on U.S. foreign policy and military thinking. The United States already was becoming 
more unilateral in its approach to the rest of the world in the early post-Cold war era 
                                                 
269  Radu, Terrorism After the Cold War, p. 282. 
270  See Kurth, The War and the West, p. 326-327: „However, as the case of Al Qaeda demonstrated, the 
transnational network still has to operate in some kind of territory. In most cases, this means it has to 
operate with the support of the state which rules over that territory […] (as was the case with the 
Taliban in Afghanistan). The transnational terrorist network may not vulnerable to a deterrence from 
the United States, but the state that harbors it is. This is why President Bush was right to immediately 
link the terrorists of global reach with the state that harbor them. The U.S. military operation that 
destroyed the Taliban and replaced it with a coalition satisfactory to the United States has greatly 
enhanced the credibility of this U.S. deterrence threat aimed at other Muslim States.“ 
271  United Nations S.C. Res. 1368, September 12, 2001; United Nations S.C. Res. 1373, September 28, 
2001. 
272  Statement by the North Atlantic Council, September 12, 2001. 
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while Europeans were embarking on a new and vigorous effort to build a more 
comprehensive international legal system. The United States has contained its unilateral 
approach during the Kosovo campaign for a last time and was then willing to preserve 
transatlantic cohesion even at the cost of military effectiveness. According to Robert 
Kagan, America fought in the Balkans “ultimately to preserve ‘the West’.”273 
Nevertheless, the Kosovo war, which was ironically fought to protect a Muslim minority, 
made visible to the Western countries the widening technology and military capability 
gap between the United States and the European nations. Leveling military effectiveness 
below cohesion within the Western camp was, however, only possible as long as vital 
interests of the United States were not threatened. For this reason, September 11 was a 
true watershed not only in the relationship between the Muslim world and the West but 
for the cohesion within the Western camp as well: 
 
In fact the Kosovo war showed how difficult it was going to be for the 
United States and its European allies to fight any war together. What if 
they had to fight a war not primarily ‘humanitarian’ in nature? […] What 
if Americans had suffered horrendous attacks on their own territory and 
feared more attacks were coming? […] The answer to those questions 
came after September 11. With almost three thousand dead in New York 
City, and Osama bin Laden on the loose in Afghanistan, the U.S. military 
and the Bush administration had little interest in working through 
NATO.274 
  
The situation reminds at the problems the Western countries faced during the 
suppression of the Boxer rebellion. Although the Western powers and Japan agreed that 
the Boxer movement posed a threat to their interests, they could not agree, however, how 
to fight the war and which means and tactics seemed appropriate. When bin Laden made 
clear overtures to Europeans, calling them “our neighbors north of the Mediterranean”, 
and publicly offering them a truce in April 2004, he tried to exploit the Western strategic 
dissonances and to drive a wedge between America and its European allies.275 However, 
the West knows that he is determined to preserve cohesion in order to fight terrorism on a 
                                                 
273  Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: American and Europe in the New World Order, New York 
2004, p. 50. 
274  Ibid, p. 51. 
275  “Bin Laden” Offers Europe Truce, http://new.bbc.co.uk/1/world/middle_east/3627775.stm.  
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global scale. Allies are essential for success in the war on terrorism, which helps to 
explain the determination of the Bush administration to build up a broad coalition and 
why the European states all rejected such a move.  
The problems the West faces today in coming to grips for a common anti-terror 
strategy are rooted deeply in different defense cultures in America and Europe. While 
American grand strategy is unquestionable global in its orientation, this is not obviously 
true for Europe. Michael Radu emphasizes that  
 
September 11 has demonstrated that anti-Western, especially anti-
American, sentiments are far stronger than its ideological differences with 
Islamic fundamentalism. When not openly applauding the September 11 
attacks, the European left ‘explained’ them by blaming the United States’ 
policies and opposing any U.S. counterattack, in the name of peace, 
innocent Afghan civilians, or the need to seek the “root causes” of Osama 
bin Laden’s Islamic fanaticism.276 
 
Hence, there is a threat that the war on terror could be transformed into one 
involving the U.S. essentially alone. While in the short term this could be seductive for 
American politicians because it would allow them to fight wars without convincing their 
European partners of the necessity, this would lead to a situation in which the West as 
such would cease to exist. The bottom line is that the United States and Europe have a 
basic incentive to maintain cohesion and the broadest possible coalition within the West 
and beyond, to ensure the isolation and hasten the destruction of terrorism with a global 
reach. 
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VI. SUMMARY 
Both in the genesis of the Boxer Uprising and also in its suppression, intercultural 
perception patterns played an important role. William J. Duiker gave his study on the 
Boxer Uprising the logically correct title: “Cultures in Collision.”277 The Boxer groups 
developed against the background of a social situation rich in conflict potential, into 
which they were increasingly dragged themselves. In the course of the conflict, they 
increasingly perceived foreigners and Chinese Christians as the real cause of the 
ecological, economical and social plight under which the rural population of China had to 
suffer. This “bogeyman image” had a certain tradition in China, but appears to have been 
activated by the Boxers against the background of the concrete conflicts in question. Its 
creation can be described as an intercultural drawing of a border, in which all the Chinese 
who in some way, apparently or actually, had had anything to do with foreigners (above 
all, naturally, the Chinese Christians) were defined as agents of the foreigners and 
members of the opposing camp. 
What was seen as a fight against foreigners in the eyes of the Boxers was, 
however, all too frequently only the continuation of existing inner-Chinese conflicts by 
other means. This particularly applies to conflicts between Boxers and civil servants and 
to the misogyny of the Boxers. To this extent, the Boxer Uprising was not a bilateral 
conflict between cultures clearly distinguished from one another from the outset, but an 
attempt to reduce the complexity of a diffuse cultural mixture by a radical drawing of a 
border and to reverse the consequences of the incipient Westernization of Chinese society 
by brutal application of violence. This war against Western modernity was for the most 
part neither conscious nor explicit and was directed against the whole process of change, 
just as it is today in the Islamic world. The Boxers located the ultimate source of the 
cataclysmic changes in the Chinese society in the West and attributed the disruption of 
their old way of life to the impact of Western domination, Western influence, and 
Western precept and example. Islamic fundamentalism works the same way. It  
 
                                                 
277  Duiker, Cultures in Collision.  
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has given an aim and form to the otherwise aimless and formless 
resentment and anger of the Muslim masses at the forces that have 
devalued their traditional values and loyalties and, in the final analysis, 
robbed them of their beliefs, their aspirations, their dignity, and to an 
increasing extent even their livelihood.278 
 
On the other hand, the deployment of the intervention troops was based on a 
much more unambiguous cultural demarcation. In Europe and the USA, the Boxers' 
actions led to the activation of old bogeymen, used not only with regard to China, but 
also other non-European peoples. References to international law, which the Chinese 
were alleged to have breached, facilitated a pronounced drawing of a border between 
“civilized” Europe and “uncivilized” China.279 The unification of European "morality" 
and European hegemony carried out in this context was a matter of course for most 
contemporaries. Western civilization was regarded as being superior to all other 
civilizations, as the highest development phase of mankind and thus as globally valid. 
The civilizational pressure of the West thus did not originate solely from considerations 
of power, but it claimed a very deeply human ethos for itself. The propagation of its own 
culture and civilization simultaneously became the assignment for mankind for the West, 
the “white man’s burden”. Groups and forces, which opposed Western civilization 
despite the obvious superiority, were backward, stubborn and in the end barbarians who 
simply would not listen. Similar thinking patterns are articulated in the West even now 
with a view to the threat by Islamic terror. In his recent work “Civilization and its 
Enemies,” Lee Harris writes:  
 
The civilization that the United States is now called upon to defend is not 
America’s or even the West’s; it is the civilization created by all men and 
women, everywhere on the planet, who have worked to make the actual 
community around them less addicted to violence, more open, more 
tolerant, more trusting. […] Those who are working for this purpose are 
all on the same side, and we all have a common enemy. It is an enemy 
whose origin goes back to the dawn of history, and indeed, the enemy that 
began the whole bloody and relentless cycle of violence and war, the 
eternal gang of ruthless men.280 
                                                 
278  Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, p. 59. 
279  See Klein, Der Boxeraufstand als interkultureller Konflikt, p. 58. 
280  Harris, Civilization and Its Enemies, p. 216. 
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The brutal warfare of the allies in China had the objective of exercising 
retribution, but also of simultaneously teaching the Chinese a lesson to keep them from a 
repetition and to make them respect European standards. At least the anti-Chinese 
“bogeyman” was not shared by all, and both the deployments of the troops and also the 
role of the missionaries in China were the object of vehement public criticism. These 
intra-society conflicts were joined by the rivalry of the powers in China itself, which was 
also partly based on intercultural perception patterns.  
The intervention of the eight powers, in particular the difficulty of bringing it to a 
successful political conclusion, is an early example of the current problems of the 
international fight against terror. An intervention selectively accentuates power and 
provides a remedy from a state of affairs sensed to be acute by the relevant public of the 
intervening state. Leeway for set-up and organization is only opened to a slight and 
generally also overestimated extent. However, it legitimates itself in a discourse 
emphasizing humanity and the creation of universal order. This grows into a tendency of 
setting unrealistic objectives for it – be it the upheaval of the trade relationships or the 
set-up of a democratic and prospering state. Both would be equivalent to a revolution in 
the social and political situation and would demand the permanent occupation of the 
country – which is contained in neither the term “intervention” nor the plans made before 
the intervention and the justifications brought forward. 
To sum up, it may be stated that the West in no way sees itself confronted with a 
new challenge never encountered before September 11. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are in 
the end an expression of the same forces of resistance that also led to the origination of 
the Boxers in 19th century China. The civilizational pressure that the West unavoidably 
developed by its imperialistic policy in the 19th and early 20th centuries was replaced by 
the penetration of the world with values, standards and symbols of the Western way of 
life and civilization in the course of globalization. The West ought to understand that the 
current terrorist threat is not “the next stage of history,” as Lee Harris erroneously puts it, 
but a known historical phenomenon in a new form, for which neither the West nor other 
cultures bear the blame. William J. Duiker impressively summarized these problems in 
1978 in connection with the Boxer Uprising:  
98 
 
In the fundamental conflict between the West and the East, there can, of 
course, be no attempt to apportion blame. The causes of conflict were 
inherent in the wide divergence between two civilizations which had 
grown up separate and independent, but which, with the mechanical 
progress which was taking place in the West, could no longer remain 
isolated. The West was not at fault in following its natural tendency 
toward progress and expansion; nor can it legitimately criticize China for 
desiring to maintain those traditions which past experience had proven to 
be good. Not even the insistent aggression of the West, or the obstinacy 
with which China opposed all foreign innovations can be imputed to either 
party as evil-doing; the governments of China and of the West merely 
expressed, in their respective policies, the natural aspirations of two 
dissimilar worlds.281 
 
The West would be well advised to evaluate its historical experience critically in 
its approach to solving the terror problem. 
                                                 
281  George Nye Steiger, China and the Occident. The Origin and Development of the Boxer Movement, 
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